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Unbundling Constitutionality
Richard Primus†
Constitutional theory features a persistent controversy over the source or
sources of constitutional status, that is, over the criteria that qualify some rules as
constitutional rules. This Article contends that no single criterion characterizes all
of the rules that American law treats as constitutional, such that it is a mistake to
think of constitutionality as a status with necessary conditions. It is better to think
of constitutionality on a bundle-of-sticks model: different attributes associated with
constitutionality might or might not be present in any constitutional rule. Analysts
should often direct their attention more to the separate substantive properties that
are associated with constitutionality than to the question of constitutional status
itself.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article is about constitutionality. Not surprisingly, that
concept pervades the field we call constitutional law. We describe United States v Windsor1 as a constitutional case, free
speech as a constitutional principle,2 and reverse incorporation
as a constitutional doctrine.3 When the President appoints agency heads while the Senate is in pro forma session, we say that
his actions raise “constitutional issues” or “constitutional concerns.”4 But what are we saying about these cases, principles,
doctrines, issues, and concerns when we describe them as
constitutional?5
1

133 S Ct 2675 (2013).
See, for example, Virginia v Black, 538 US 343, 359 (2003).
3
See Peter J. Rubin, Taking Its Proper Place in the Constitutional Canon: Bolling
v. Sharpe, Korematsu, and the Equal Protection Component of Fifth Amendment Due
Process, 92 Va L Rev 1879, 1882–83 (2006) (describing the reverse incorporation doctrine).
4
See Noel Canning v NLRB, 705 F3d 490, 493 (DC Cir 2013); Matthew C. Stephenson, Can the President Appoint Principal Executive Officers without a Senate Confirmation Vote?, 122 Yale L J 940, 942–44 (2013).
5
“Constitutional” is here the opposite of “nonconstitutional,” not the opposite of
“unconstitutional.” To say that a rule is “constitutional” in the sense in which that term
is opposed to “unconstitutional” is merely to say that the rule is constitutionally permitted. In the sense in which the term is opposed to “nonconstitutional,” a rule is
2
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Characterizing a rule as constitutional might mean that it
appears in the written Constitution. It might mean that the rule
prevails in conflicts with other kinds of rules, that it cannot be
changed by ordinary legislation, or that it can be enforced by
courts even in the face of contrary action by other officials. It
might mean that the rule concerns the structure of government,
that it protects a fundamental American value, or that it enjoys
a sacred status in American society. In one sense or another, all
of the foregoing meanings point to attributes of constitutionality.
But theorists disagree about the relationships among those attributes, and they disagree in particular about what entitles a
rule to constitutional status in the first place. Often, the disagreement seems to concern the fundamental question of what
qualifies a rule for constitutional status in something like—let’s
say for now—a legally authoritative sense.
The running disagreement about the basis for constitutional
status often focuses on the role of the document we call the Constitution. In one family of views, a rule is constitutional if and
only if it appears in, or at least derives from, the text of that
document.6 If a rule is textually grounded, it enjoys constitutional status, and it is entitled to the privileged treatment that
other attributes of constitutionality specify. A constitutional rule
prevails in conflicts with nonconstitutional rules, is entrenched
against change through ordinary legislation, and can be enforced
by courts exercising the power of judicial review. Those are the
payoffs of constitutional status, and textuality is the criterion.
This, in capsule form, is one important approach to constitutionality. It has gone by different names at different times, including
“interpretivism”7 and then, more accurately, “textualism.”8 An
“constitutional” if it is one of the rules in light of which other rules are permitted or not.
So, to use an example, “Congress may levy taxes on incomes” is an example of a constitutional rule in the sense relevant for this paper. “Capital gains income is subject to a 15%
tax” is an example of a constitutional rule in the other sense. It is a rule permitted by
constitutional law, not a rule of constitutional law.
6
See, for example, Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and
the Law 37–41 (Princeton 1997); Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith 29 (Princeton
1988) (describing adherents to the “protestant” theory of constitutional textualism); John
F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts,
113 Yale L J 1663, 1665 (2004); Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term—
Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 Harv L Rev 26, 26–28 (2000).
7
See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 1 (Harvard 1980); Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 Stan L Rev
703, 710–11 (1975).
8
John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 Colum L Rev
70, 73 (2006); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 Stan L Rev 1, 1 (1984).
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important strain in recent scholarship calls it the “big-C” approach because of the essential role that it reserves for the written Constitution—the proper noun, with a capital “C.”9
A rival idea, which we can call the “small-c” approach,
draws on an older and more generic meaning of the noun “constitution.”10 According to this approach, the “constitution” (with
a lowercase “c”) is the web of documents, practices, institutions,
norms, and traditions that structure American government.11
Small-c theory is internally diverse, but it has a unifying theme:
many constitutional rules are not grounded in the text of the
big-C Constitution.12 Most small-c theorists agree that rules appearing in that document are constitutional rules, but they
maintain that constitutionality can have other sources as well.
To go back to the list of attributes of constitutional rules identified above, small-c theorists often hold that rules not appearing
in the text are nevertheless constitutional because they are important to the structure of government or because they reflect
fundamental American values.13
It should be clear that the real dispute between big-C and
small-c theorists is not about the meaning of a term. Reasonable
people on both sides understand that a word can carry many
meanings. Small-c constitutionalists understand that in the
United States the word “Constitution” names the 1787 document as amended, and big-C constitutionalists understand that
there is an older sense of “constitution” that, as applied to the
United States, describes something broader than that document.

9
See William N. Eskridge Jr and John Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New
American Constitution 25 (Yale 2010); Levinson, Constitutional Faith at 33 (cited in note
6); Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional
Commitment, 124 Harv L Rev 657, 700 (2011).
10 See Levinson, Constitutional Faith at 33 (cited in note 6); Walter Bagehot, The
English Constitution 4–6 (Chapman and Hall 1867); Aristotle, Constitution of Athens
and Related Texts 83, 113–16 (Hafner 1950) (Kurt Von Fritz and Ernst Kapp, trans);
Levinson, 124 Harv L Rev at 700 (cited in note 9).
11 See Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution: The Precedents and
Principles We Live By ix–xvi (2012); Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes at 1–
2 (cited in note 9); Levinson, Constitutional Faith at 33–37 (cited in note 6); Christopher
G. Tiedeman, The Unwritten Constitution of the United States: A Philosophical Inquiry
into the Fundamentals of American Constitutional Law 16 (Putnam 1890); Ernest A.
Young, The Constitution outside the Constitution, 117 Yale L J 408, 414 (2007).
12 See, for example, David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution 34–35 (Oxford 2010);
Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional
Meaning 1–9 (Harvard 1999); Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution 93–94 (Oxford 1982).
13 See note 12.
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What is in dispute is the relationship of the constitution (with a
small “c”) and the Constitution (with a big “C”) to authoritative
constitutionality in American law. After all, theorists of the different schools do not contend with each other only about how to
apply the label. They generally argue in order to establish that
some disputed rule is or is not entitled to be treated as supreme
law, or as entrenched against revision, or as enforceable through
judicial review. We argue about the basis for constitutionality in
part in order to establish which rules are entitled to those privileged payoffs.
The structure of that argument points to something that
most small-c theory shares with the big-C approach. On both
sides of the divide, constitutionality is understood as a status
that rules do or do not enjoy in light of some qualifying criteria.
A known set of payoffs is then supposed to follow from constitutional status. Different small-c theories have different accounts
of the qualifying criteria and of the payoffs, and not every payoff
of constitutionality is claimed for every rule labeled “constitutional.” But as a general matter, big-C and small-c theory alike
proceed by grouping the various attributes of constitutionality
together, identifying some as bases for constitutional status and
others as its consequences.
My contention in this Article is that it is misleading to think
of constitutionality as a status with bases and payoffs. Instead,
we should think of it in the way that an earlier generation of
theorists learned to understand property: as a bundle of sticks
that can be separated from one another or that can be recombined in varying configurations.14 Some rules that are stated in
the text of the Constitution are supreme over other rules, and
some are not. Some rules that are enforceable through judicial
review are in the text, and some are not. Some rules arising
from structure are entrenched against revision, and some are
not. And so on. No single attribute of constitutionality characterizes every rule that mainstream American practice calls “constitutional.” Instead, constitutional rules exhibit a mix-and-match
variety of characteristics, none of which is fully definitive of the
status.
The point should be pushed a step further. Just as no single
attribute is essential for constitutional status, no attribute

14 See, for example, Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 Harv L
Rev 1691, 1691 (2012) (describing the bundle-of-sticks conception).
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associated with constitutionality—trivial exceptions aside—is
either necessary or sufficient for a rule’s exhibiting any other
characteristic of constitutional rules. A rule stated in the text
might or might not operate as supreme law, might or might not
be fundamental to the structure of government, and might or
might not be enforceable through judicial review. A rule derived
from the structure of government might or might not be enforceable through judicial review, might or might not require Article
V amendment to be changed, and might or might not operate as
supreme law. And so on. As a result, it is misleading to arrange
the attributes of constitutionality into a set of bases and a set of
payoffs, because—subject to minor exceptions—no characteristic
of constitutionality necessarily follows from any other.
This claim is a form of small-c constitutionalism, but it
pushes farther than most small-c theory has gone. The essential
move of small-c theory is to decouple one of the attributes of constitutional status, namely textuality, from constitutionality itself.15 That move is a partial unbundling of constitutionality. But
small-c theory generally does not take the project of unbundling
as far as it would helpfully go. For one thing, some small-c theory shares the big-C impulse to define essential qualifying attributes of constitutional status—not textuality, but something
else.16 For another, small-c theory commonly assumes that a
particular set of payoffs (often including judicial review) follows
from constitutional status, if only constitutionality is understood
in the right way.17 My point here, however, is that each of these
attributes is also severable from the constitutional bundle, much
as textuality is. Just as it is a mistake to think of constitutionality as the bundle of characteristics that big-C theory presents, it
is generally a mistake to think of it as some other bundle of
characteristics that automatically travel together.
The approach I offer might seem to make constitutional decisionmaking dangerously indeterminate. Just as conceiving of
property as a bundle of sticks can make it more difficult to say
who “owns” Blackacre,18 understanding constitutionality as a
15 See, for example, David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation,
63 U Chi L Rev 877, 883 (1996) (“It is the rare constitutional case in which the text plays
any significant role.”). See also Levinson, Constitutional Faith at 54–89 (cited in note 6);
Tiedeman, The Unwritten Constitution at 155 (cited in note 11).
16 See, for example, K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 Colum L
Rev 1, 22 (1934) (describing “highly probable permanence” as the “one essential criterion”).
17 See Part II.B.
18 See Smith, 125 Harv L Rev at 1691–92 (cited in note 14).
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bundle of sticks can make it more problematic to say that a given rule is, or is not, constitutional. Suppose that American law
does feature (1) rules fundamental to the structure of government but not enforceable by judicial review, (2) rules enforced by
judicial review but not stated in the text, (3) rules stated in the
text that do not operate as supreme law, and (4) rules that operate as supreme law but can be changed without formal amendment. Which of these are constitutional rules? On the common
premise that the distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional rules tells decisionmakers which rules to treat as supreme, entrenched, and eligible for judicial review, there needs
to be a way to answer this question. How, after all, can a judge
exercise the power of judicial review unless he knows which
rules are constitutional? And how can he know which rules
are constitutional without an account of what qualifies as
constitutionality?
There is something sensible to this worry. Judicial review
should not be exercised cavalierly or idiosyncratically. Hence the
venerable tradition of trying to discipline its exercise with objective criteria, textual or otherwise.19 But sorting carefully
through the idea of unbundled constitutionality should reveal
that the indeterminacy it creates is less of a practical problem
than might be feared. Yes, disaggregating constitutionality into
separate components might make it more difficult, or just less
meaningful, to distinguish between rules that are constitutional
and those that are not. But it also strips the distinction of its
power to decide which rules may be judicially enforced. The line
is no longer as well marked, but it is also less consequential. We
cannot easily say what is constitutional and what is not, and,
fortunately, little depends on our ability to do so.
What decisionmakers still must decide, though, is whether
to treat particular rules as supreme, entrenched, and eligible for
judicial review. The unbundled model indicates that they cannot
answer those questions just by determining whether the rules in
question are textual, structural, fundamental to American values, or the like. They will need to make some further substantive judgments, which is exactly what many theories of

19 See, for example, Strauss, The Living Constitution at 33–34 (cited in note 12);
Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate at 29–37 (cited in note 12) (describing Justice Black’s textualism as a response to a crisis precipitated by realist theories of judging); Ely, Democracy
and Distrust at 43–69 (cited in note 7).
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constitutionality and of judicial review strive to avoid. That said,
two points of potential comfort are worth highlighting.
First, despite the long, important, and understandable tradition of worrying about undisciplined judicial review, occasions
requiring major exercises of subjective judgment on such questions are rare. Relatively few cases actually require judges to
make new decisions about whether a given rule is properly enforced through judicial review. At this stage in the development
of American law, most cases that come before courts are governed on this point by precedent, and that precedent is generally
followed.20 To be sure, some cases are not governed by precedent,
and even cases that are so governed reflect the prior exercise of
judgment, usually by some other court. But if the fear is that
judges will be left at sea, it might help to realize that most of the
time the waters are pretty well charted already.
Second, on those occasions when precedent is not clearly
dispositive, no plausible theory of judicial review succeeds in
eliminating the need for exercises of judgment. That being the
case, it may be better to have an accurate understanding of the
judicial task, even if that understanding leaves important questions open, rather than to rest on a theory that answers more
questions but does so less accurately.21 To be sure, a sound theory that answered more questions about when and why judges
should exercise judicial review would be more valuable than a
20 See Richard Primus, Limits of Interpretivism, 32 Harv J L & Pub Pol 159, 164–
67, 172 (2009); Strauss, 63 U Chi L Rev at 883 (cited in note 15).
21 It is worth acknowledging the possibility that understanding a practice accurately is not always the practitioner’s highest good. Perhaps a swimmer or a saxophonist
might perform better without a precise understanding of all of her necessary physical
movements, because operating with the precise understanding might cause her to focus
on and worry about things that she would otherwise have done properly without conscious attention. Or perhaps the driver of a car will drive more safely with a slightly falsified understanding of his vehicle than if he truly understands everything the car can
do. (I do not mean to take any position with respect to these specific examples; I mean
only to suggest the nature of the concern.) If judging is such a practice, one might wonder whether American law would be better off if judges stuck to the idea that judicial
review calls for them just to make their best assessments of formal authorities like constitutional text, rather than requiring them to consider in a more substantive way
whether some rule should be judicially enforced. After all, the thought would run, the
judges have been doing a reasonably good job up until now, even if they are operating
with a slight misunderstanding of their activity; a more accurate understanding might
either unnerve them (thus impeding their function) or liberate them (thus opening the
door to mischief). I suppose that’s possible. As a piece of scholarship, though, the function of this Article is to present a picture accurately, and perhaps thereby to do more
good than harm, rather than to proceed on the assumption that clear-sighted understanding is on balance a dangerous thing.
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theory answering fewer of those questions. But it is not my ambition in this Article to develop a thorough and actionable justification for judicial review. Instead, I hope to lay bare some features of current practice that such a theory of judicial review
should take into account. If the reality of constitutional practice
is that the putative payoffs of constitutionality are not really
driven by a set of formal criteria, we would improve our understanding by recognizing the fact.
One more framing assumption is worth specifying here. My
claim—that the attributes of constitutionality behave more like
sticks in a bundle than like a set of necessary bases and the
payoffs that follow—is a claim about the existing practice of constitutional law in the United States. Each time I adduce evidence, as for example by pointing out that a given rule is treated
as supreme or as enforceable through judicial review, I mean to
report a feature of the practice as it exists. I do not offer deep
justifications for these practices, and constitutional law as a
whole might be improved by altering some of the practices I report. Perhaps some rule that is now treated as judicially enforceable should not be; perhaps some rule that is treated as
changeable through ordinary legislation should be considered
entrenched until overcome by some higher threshold for change.
We have no reason, after all, to think that existing practice is
perfect. That said, I presume throughout this Article that the existing practice of constitutional law in the United States is also
not radically deficient. On that presumption, I investigate the
system as it actually functions.
Not everyone shares that presumption. Some theorists see
prevailing practice as a serious perversion of the constitutional
system properly understood, such that the best course of action
would be radical reform.22 If so, one such reform might be the
bundling of constitutional attributes that I claim are best understood as separable sticks. In other words, some readers will be
inclined to say that, if there are in fact a bunch of rules that are
enforced through judicial review but not in the text or in the text
but not treated as supreme law, that fact is regrettable, if not illegitimate. The appropriate response to our present reality, the
argument might run, is not to build a constitutional theory on
this unhappy mess but to insist on a more orderly system in
22 See, for example, Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty 354–57 (Princeton 2004); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the
Commerce Power, 73 Va L Rev 1387, 1387–88 (1987).
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which constitutionality has a clear set of bases and a clear set of
payoffs, whether on the textual model or on one of the small-c
alternatives.
My own suspicion, for what it is worth, is that this objection
is both too pessimistic about the system that now operates and
too optimistic about a preferred alternative. But I do not mean
to pursue this line of disagreement to any great depth. For present purposes, suffice it to say that the analysis presented here
is a characterization of American constitutional practice as we
know it. That practice is imperfect, but it is not a failure. Understanding how it operates is at least as worthwhile an endeavor
as speculating about some other system that seems unlikely to
replace it.
In Part I of this Article, I illustrate the idea of constitutionality as a bundle of sticks by reference to what I have called the
big-C approach. In Part II, I apply the same analysis to what I
have called small-c approaches. Those approaches admit of
greater complexity than the big-C approach, because they are
not rooted in the simplifying idea that constitutional rules all
share a single basis. But many small-c accounts still imagine
constitutionality as a bundled status, with a broader set of bases
driving a known set of payoffs.
The reality, I argue, is more complex still. The attributes of
constitutionality combine in many different configurations, such
that it is generally unwise to draw conclusions about a rule’s
status with respect to some of those attributes by reference to its
status with respect to others. Accordingly, officials who must decide whether a given rule should be treated as supreme or entrenched or enforceable through judicial review should not frame
their inquiry in terms of whether that rule is constitutional. After all, establishing the constitutionality of a rule will not answer the question that the decisionmaker must resolve, because
no set of consequences reliably follows from a rule’s being constitutional. To settle the actionable question, a decisionmaker must
know something more. He must push beyond constitutionality.
I. THE BIG-C BUNDLE
A.

Four Sticks

A simple form of the big-C vision can be understood as imagining constitutionality as a status with four elements. The first
element is textuality. On this vision, constitutional rules are
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those—and only those—that are stated in the text of the written
document we call the Constitution. The second element is supremacy. Constitutional rules are superior to other legal rules,
such that a collision between a constitutional rule and any other
legal rule must be resolved in favor of the constitutional rule.
The third element is supermajoritarian entrenchment. Constitutional rules can be changed only through the process described
in Article V; any nonconstitutional legal rule can be changed by
ordinary legislation. Finally, the fourth element is eligibility for
enforcement through judicial review. Courts have the authority
to enforce constitutional rules—but only constitutional rules—
when doing so requires nullifying enacted legislation.23
Two nods to nuance are here in order. First, textuality need
not mean wooden literalism.24 Consider the distinction between
the “hard textualism” that insists upon reading every word of
applicable constitutional text closely and the “soft textualism”
that accepts “reasonable” though nonliteral readings of constitutional text.25 A rule that is textual on either approach can be sufficiently textual to be big-C constitutional, so long as the text is
the genuine source of the rule. Second, few sophisticated constitutional practitioners insist that this big-C picture fully and accurately captures American constitutionalism, either descriptively or normatively. Outside of confirmation hearings, many
people freely recognize the nontextual bases of some constitutional rules, and even those generally inclined toward textualism usually acknowledge that a certain amount of nontextual
constitutional law exists in practice.26 (For some, of course, that
statement is made as a criticism of the practice that exists.)27
23 It is tempting to recharacterize these four propositions as one unified idea: that
the text of the written Constitution and only the text of the written Constitution is the
supreme law. Article V is part of the written Constitution, so the element of entrenchment might follow from the fact of textual supremacy. And though many have contested
the point, many others read Article III to authorize judicial review. On that reading, all
four elements of the big-C approach are present in the statement that the written Constitution is the supreme law. This articulation of the big-C idea as one unified whole presents that approach in what this Article would call its most fully bundled form.
24 See, for example, Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 Va L Rev 347, 348
(2005) (“[N]o ‘textualist’ favors isolating [ ] language from its surrounding context.”).
25 Richard Primus, Constitutional Expectations, 109 Mich L Rev 91, 97–98 (2010).
26 See, for example, Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 129, 139–40 (cited in note
6) (describing the role of stare decisis).
27 See Martin H. Redish and Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional
Interpretation, and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 Fla L Rev 1485, 1512 (2012) (describing nontextualism as a threat to “constitutional democracy”).
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With those qualifications understood, I want to call attention to three features of the picture I have sketched. First, the
big-C vision shapes a good deal of thinking about constitutional
law, even if most sophisticated practitioners regard it as incomplete. Most well-educated Americans who are not constitutional
lawyers would probably supply something like this picture if
asked to explain the role of constitutional law in American government. Certainly a great many law students enter their studies with something like this picture in mind, and many of them
strive admirably to keep faith with that picture as they learn
more and more about constitutional law. Even among theorists
and practitioners who would say that some constitutional law
lacks a textual basis, the big-C vision may supply a picture of
constitutional law’s normal case. Yes, the thought would run,
there are instances in which other things are going on. But those
instances are exceptions rather than the standard mode.
Second, the big-C vision I have sketched understands the
four elements of constitutionality to travel together as a single
bundle. A rule stated in the text is supreme and is entrenched
and is eligible for judicial enforcement. A rule that cannot be
changed except by amendment is supreme and is eligible for judicial enforcement and is grounded in the text. And so on.
Third, textuality is the basis of constitutional status, and
the other three elements are payoffs. To be sure, identifying any
one of the four elements as a property of a given rule establishes
the rule’s constitutional status. Only constitutional rules have
these properties, so the presence of any of the four elements establishes constitutionality, which also means that it establishes
the presence of the other three elements. But the fact that one
can establish a rule’s constitutionality by demonstrating any one
of the four elements is evidentiary. As a justificatory matter, a
rule is constitutional because it is written in the text. The other
three elements are the payoffs that follow. Thus, the fact that a
rule is enforced through judicial review indicates its constitutionality, and what that implicitly means is that the exercise of
(legitimate) judicial review indicates that there is a textual justification for the rule.
This vision of constitutionality as a status with one basis
(text) and three consistent payoffs (supremacy, entrenchment,
judicial reviewability) has some considerable virtues. It is simple. It seems to capture well a canonical set of the virtues of

2013]

Unbundling Constitutionality

1091

written constitutionalism.28 It resonates with the widely held vision of the written Constitution as the authoritative basis of
American government.29 It teaches that government officials are
subject to a set of rules that they cannot alter by their own decree. And to the extent that it is internalized, it plays an important role in both enabling and constraining the practice of judicial review.30 By presenting judicial review as the enforcement
of a specified set of legitimately formulated rules, this big-C vision offers a clear and apparently mostly palatable explanation
for why the work of elected officials must sometimes be set
aside. At the same time, it cautions the judges against adventurism by telling them that their authority is limited by the content
of those rules. To be sure, many judges understand that the judiciary can and does strike down laws that do not contravene
any text in the written Constitution. But even so, the fact that
the prevailing explanation for the legitimacy of judicial review
requires appeal to an objective authority may help discourage
judges from thinking of their own considered views as sufficient
bases for declaring laws invalid.31

28 See, for example, Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803) (articulating virtues of a written Constitution).
29 A community can be mistaken about its own practices. But other things being
equal, it is a virtue for a theory of a social practice to be consistent with the selfunderstandings of the participants in that practice. See Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures 14–15 (Basic Books 1973).
30 To be sure, one might count enabling judicial review as a liability: more than one
important theorist has suggested that we would be better off without judicial review.
See, for example, Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case against Judicial Review, 115
Yale L J 1346, 1353 (2006). But without taking the time necessary to argue the point all
the way through, I will proceed on the premise that judicial review is, on balance, a net
good within the system of American government. This is by no means to say that judicial
review as it currently exists in the United States is the optimal form of judicial review. It
is only to say, with full knowledge that the proposition would be very difficult to prove,
that we are on balance better off with this institution as it exists than we would be if it
did not exist at all.
31 The prevalence of the big-C idea executes these functions whether or not the
substance of the idea accurately describes the operation of American constitutional law.
The relevant effects on the attitudes and behaviors of judges and other officials—to
whatever extent those effects materialize—follow from the fact that people articulate or
subscribe to the big-C idea. In other words, the big-C idea need not be offered for the
truth of the matter asserted. The assertion itself does a good deal of work, much of it desirable. To be sure, people who take the big-C idea seriously might balk at having it depicted as a helpful fable rather than a working theory of government, and at the extreme
limit it is possible that the salutary effects of asserting the big-C picture would unravel if
too many people came to think of it as a fable alone. But at present, no such danger
seems to present itself. The big-C idea is alive and well.
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My project here, however, is to demonstrate a key respect in
which the big-C vision thoroughly misdescribes the operative realities of American government. In practice, the different elements of constitutionality that big-C theory bundles together often travel separately. Many propositions that courts
uncontroversially enforce through the power of judicial review
are not derived from the Constitution’s text. The text of the Constitution contains propositions that do not function as supreme
law, despite never having been superseded by formal amendment. And many rules that have been treated as supreme law at
some point in time have been changed by mechanisms other
than the one that Article V deems necessary to overcome constitutional entrenchment.
I am not the first person to make most of the preceding
claims.32 As noted above, few sophisticated American lawyers insist on big-C theory in its most inflexible form. And to the extent
that practitioners and theorists of constitutional law recognize
that the big-C picture is an oversimplification, a demonstration
that constitutional practice departs from that picture will not be
useful news. The aim of the analysis that follows, however, is
not simply to show that the big-C conception is not a complete
picture of mainstream constitutional practice. It is to show that
the idea of constitutionality as a status with one basis (text) and
three payoffs (supremacy, formal entrenchment, and judicial review) fails even as a rough approximation. Considered dispassionately, the big-C account is no more plausible as a description
of constitutional practice—and perhaps considerably less plausible—than an account in which constitutional law is dominated
by rules whose bases lie outside the text.
Perhaps the best way to unbundle the big-C picture of constitutionality is to give examples of well-accepted rules that
have some but not others of the four properties that the big-C
picture bundles together. So consider Figure 1, located at page
1105. This four-by-four grid has sixteen boxes representing all
the ways in which a rule might have one of the elements in the

32 See, for example, Strauss, The Living Constitution at 115–17 (cited in note 12);
Charles L. Black Jr, Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law 11, 29–32 (LSU
1969) (arguing for nontextual sources of constitutional law); Tiedeman, The Unwritten
Constitution at 155 (cited in note 11); Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120
Harv L Rev 1737, 1741–43 (2007) (describing processes of constitutional change other
than Article V); Grey, 27 Stan L Rev at 706–10 (cited in note 7) (arguing for nontextual
sources of constitutional law); Llewellyn, 34 Colum L Rev at 3–4 (cited in note 16).
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big-C bundle but lack one of the other elements, and the boxes
are populated with examples.
For Figure 1 and other parts of the present claim to be persuasive, though, my argument must overcome an obstacle regarding the selection of rules that are to count as examples.
Suppose that in the course of arguing that nontextual rules are
pervasive in constitutional law, I offer rules about commandeering, state sovereign immunity, and abortion as examples of nontextual constitutional rules. Someone who wanted to resist my
perspective—that is, someone who wanted to argue that nontextual rules are rare or nonexistent within constitutional law—
might contest the legitimacy of those examples in either of two
ways. First, he might pronounce some or all of those rules invalid and thus not really admissible as evidence of constitutional
law properly understood. This possibility arises from the persistent fact that many (putative) constitutional rules are of contested validity. To the extent that we cannot agree on what rules
count as the rules of constitutional law, it will be hard to convince each other of claims about the set of constitutional rules.
Second, even if a critic of my argument agreed that the rules
about commandeering or abortion or state sovereign immunity
are valid examples of constitutional rules, he might dispute my
characterization of those rules as nontextual. People see different things in the same texts, after all. If we cannot agree about
whether a given rule is present in the text, we will be less able
to convince each other that textuality is, or is not, a necessary
(or nearly necessary) property of constitutional rules.
I doubt that these obstacles can be overcome to the satisfaction of every reader. To be fully persuasive, my argument would
need to make use of a set of examples that everyone agrees are
examples of valid constitutional rules, and it would also require
broad agreement about whether each rule discussed was in fact
textual, supreme, formally entrenched, and subject to judicial
review. The community of constitutional practitioners is too diverse in its views for full consensus to be feasible on these
points. It may be possible, however, to offer an analysis that
rests on enough common ground to persuade many and perhaps
most readers that the four sticks in the big-C bundle can be
pulled apart. To that end, I adhere to two methodological principles.
First, to the greatest extent possible, I will discuss only
rules whose validity is broadly accepted within the world of
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constitutional practice. That does not mean that I will avoid discussing rules with which some people disagree. Someone doubts
the validity of just about every rule, including the rule authorizing the existence of the Federal Reserve Bank33 and the rule forbidding the racial segregation of a state’s public schools.34 It
means, rather, that I will limit myself to rules that are relied on
as a matter of course in the practice of constitutional law, and
will avoid rules whose validity is the subject of significant ongoing contest. If I confine my analysis to rules of that kind, then
critics who would respond by denying that the rules I adduce are
valid illustrations of American constitutional law will be in the
position of offering a radical critique of the practice, rather than
of contesting my description of the practice as it exists.
Second, I will articulate criteria for classifying rules as textual, supreme, formally entrenched, or judicially reviewable.
Some of these characterizations are slippery because they turn
on matters of contested judgment. Sometimes we differ in our
assessment of phenomena we observe: different people read
texts differently, so a rule that seems textual to one person
might seem nontextual to someone else. In other instances, clear
right answers about whether rules exhibit these characteristics
are elusive because they rest on predictions about the conduct of
actors in the system. To say that a rule is entrenched by the
terms of Article V, for example, it is not for present purposes
sufficient to point out that the rule is a constitutional rule and
that the Constitution can only be amended through Article V. To
make the case that way would simply be to report the big-C theory, rather than to demonstrate something about how American
constitutional practices actually operate. To show that a rule is
Article V entrenched as an operative matter, one would have to
show that changing the rule would in practice require an Article
V amendment. As I describe more thoroughly below, that might
be a hard demonstration to make.35
33 See Ron Paul, End the Fed 18–31 (Grand Central 2009) (arguing that the Federal Reserve is unconstitutional). But see McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316,
324–26 (1819) (upholding Congress’s creation of the Bank of the United States).
34 See Adrian Vermeule, Judging under Uncertainty: An Institutional Theory of Legal Interpretation 280 (Harvard 2006) (arguing that Brown was wrongly decided).
35 Articulating these methods should clarify what the classifications mean as used
here. To be sure, no reader is compelled to accept the choices these methods reflect. That
said, these explanations should sharpen the idea of unbundled constitutionality that is
offered in this Article because they will help elucidate a view of the relationships among
these features of constitutional rules. And if the slipperiness and uncertainty involved in
these classifications make it hard to establish that each example offered really does
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Here, then, are explanations of what it means, for purposes
of the present analysis, to say that as a matter of operative practice a rule is or is not textual, or supreme, or Article V entrenched, or judicially reviewable. The discussions of supremacy
and judicial review are relatively brief; those of textuality and
entrenchment require more complexity.
1. Textuality.
Any claim that a given rule is or is not stated in the Constitution’s text must reckon with the fact that different people understand that text to carry different meanings. In many cases,
whether the text embodies a particular rule is a matter of legitimate controversy. But the lesson here is not that differentiating
between textual and nontextual rules is a hopeless enterprise. It
is that one should be prepared to see nuance in the subject matter when approaching the categorization.
One good step in that direction is to understand textuality
as a dimensional category rather than a binary one. Rules may
be more and less grounded in the text rather than being fully
textual or fully not. With that perspective in mind, the set of
rules that properly socialized practitioners of American law
would uncontroversially identify as constitutional rules can be
imagined to lie along a continuum of textuality, and that continuum can be illustrated as follows:
(1) The rule is plainly stated in the text. (Example: Every
state gets two senators.)36
(2) The rule is fairly implied by the text. (Example: Congress can create an Air Force.)37
(3) The rule is not stated in the text, but it is associated
with a particular clause, and we have an official story explaining why that clause justifies the rule despite its
demonstrate a certain combination of constitutional characteristics, the exercise of working through the examples should still make the fully bundled big-C picture hard to maintain simply by highlighting how hard it is to say with confidence that a particular rule is
textual, supreme, formally entrenched, and judicially reviewable. The picture of big-C
bundling requires one to be able to make that judgment cleanly about every constitutional rule.
36 US Const Amend XVII.
37 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 12 (authorizing Congress to “raise and support Armies”).
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wording. (Example: The state of Michigan may not abridge
the freedom of speech.)38
(4) The rule is not stated in the text, but it is associated
with a particular clause, and we have an official story explaining why that clause entails the proposition despite its
wording, and the official story strains plausibility, but we go
with it anyway. (Example: Congress may not segregate public schools.)39
(5) The rule is not stated in the text, but it is associated
with a particular clause, and we have no story at all explaining why the clause entails the proposition despite its
wording, but we seem not to mind or even to notice. (Example: The president may not abridge the freedom of speech.)40
(6) The proposition is not stated in the text, but it is associated with a particular clause, and we acknowledge that the
wording of the clause does not entail the proposition. (Example: Congress may not commandeer state executive
officials.)41
38 See, for example, Locke v Davey, 540 US 712, 718 (2004) (treating the substantive provisions of the First Amendment as incorporated against the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth).
39 See Bolling v Sharpe, 347 US 497, 498–99 (1954). See also Richard A. Primus,
Bolling Alone, 104 Colum L Rev 975, 976 (2004) (explaining and criticizing the idea that
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is incorporated against the
federal government through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
40 See, for example, Federal Communications Commission v Fox Television Stations, Inc, 132 S Ct 2307, 2312 (2012). The idea that the First Amendment runs against
the executive branch is not controversial. But the text of the First Amendment is addressed to “Congress.” Many words in the Constitution are subject to multiple interpretations, but if pressed to identify something that the word “Congress” in the Constitution
should not be read to mean, “President” seems like a safe choice. Unlike the extension of
First Amendment norms to cover states, which is officially explained by the doctrine of
incorporation, no official story exists to explain why a text written as a limitation on the
power of Congress also works a limitation on the power of a different branch of the federal government. Much the same could be said of the idea that the guarantees of the
First Amendment run against the federal courts. See, for example, Bernard v Gulf Oil
Co, 619 F2d 459, 466–67 (5th Cir 1980) (invalidating the district court’s gag order as a
violation of the First Amendment’s guarantee of the freedom of speech). The judiciary,
like the president, is not the Congress.
41 See Printz v United States, 521 US 898, 905 (1997) (“Because there is no constitutional text speaking to this precise question, the answer to the CLEOs’ challenge must
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(7) The proposition is not even associated with any particular clause in the text. (Example: No state may unilaterally
secede from the Union.)42
The degrees of textuality that I have here assigned to these constitutional rules are the ones that seem to me most plausible as
a reader of the Constitution. Other people will likely argue for
somewhat different classifications. Because people are drawn to
varying interpretations of texts, reasonable people can disagree
about where along the continuum a given proposition falls. For
example, I have identified the proposition that Congress may
not segregate public schools as one that is associated with a
clause in the Constitution by virtue of a largely implausible official story. That story, of course, is that the text of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment incorporates the content of
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. My reasons for skepticism about that story as an account of reading the
text are conventional.43 Nonetheless, I recognize that other interpreters might find that reading of the Fifth Amendment’s
text more plausible than I do,44 in which case they might classify
this proposition as closer to (3) above than to (4). I do not think,
however, that any reasonable argument can present all seven of

be sought in historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution,
and in the jurisprudence of this Court.”). Note, however, that constitutional discourse’s
tendency to seek textual homes for doctrines, see note 45, has fostered subsequent reformulations of the anticommandeering principle under which the rule might be understood to be an interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause. See, for example, Ilya
Somin, A Mandate for Mandates: Is the Individual Health Insurance Case a Slippery
Slope?, 75 L & Contemp Probs 75, 89 & n 64 (2012) (presenting the holding of Printz as
an interpretation of the term “proper” in the Necessary and Proper Clause); Transcript of
Oral Argument, Department of Health and Human Services v Florida, No 11-398, *26–27
(US Mar 27, 2012) (available on Westlaw at 2012 WL 1017220) (Scalia) (characterizing
the holdings of Printz and New York v United States as interpretations of the term
“proper” in the Necessary and Proper Clause).
42 As the old joke has it, the legal authority for this constitutional proposition is the
case of Lee v Grant. See, for example, Josh Chafetz, Book Review, Multiplicity in Federalism and the Separation of Powers, 120 Yale L J 1084, 1097 n 74–75 (2011).
43 See, for example, Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 32 (cited in note 7) (describing
the reverse incorporation doctrine as “gibberish”). See also Primus, 104 Colum L Rev at
977 n 7 (cited in note 39) (collecting criticism of the doctrine).
44 See, for example, Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: Fidelity
and Theory, 47 Stan L Rev 395, 408–10 (1995) (arguing that Bolling correctly recognized
that Reconstruction had changed the meaning of “Due Process”).
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these constitutional rules as clearly stated in or even as fairly
implied by the text itself.45
In demonstrating that many nontextual rules are operatively supreme, entrenched, or judicially enforceable, I will use only
examples that seem to me to fall in categories (5), (6), and (7).
That is so even though rules in category (4) and perhaps even
category (3) are also probably best understood as rooted in something other than the text.46 By restricting myself to the yet more
clearly nontextual rules in categories (5), (6), and (7), I hope to
reduce the incidence of objections that proceed by contesting my
characterization of rules as nontextual. And to the degree that I
am right to regard rules in categories (3) and (4) as nontextual
too, readers should infer that the degree to which textuality can
be separated from supremacy, formal entrenchment, and judicial
review is substantially greater than the set of examples offered
here might suggest.
45 This statement is true as I write it. But it may be true only contingently, under
the circumstances of 2013. A large part of the process of constitutional change is about
shifting expectations that make it plausible to read a text differently at different times.
Part of the job description of good constitutional lawyers is to find ways to move propositions down this continuum, taking norms that seem nontextual and finding ways to read
the text so as to encompass them. Similarly, and precisely because of the background
power of the big-C vision, the pressure of a concrete need for judicial action may prompt
a court to create an official association between a proposition and a clause where there
was none before. Above, I say that the proposition that no state may secede from the Union is not even associated with any particular clause in the Constitution. But a court that
was actually called upon to review the constitutionality of a state statute announcing
that state’s secession from the Union might well read any of a number of clauses to prohibit the secession. After that date, the proposition that no state may secede would in
fact be associated with a clause, so it would no longer be an example of my seventh category. Which category the proposition would then represent would depend upon what explanation the court gave of the link between the clause and the proposition, as well as
whether the audience of constitutional lawyers—then and later—found the link plausible as a matter of reading the text. I cannot say, therefore, that the mapping I provide
above will always seem sensible to conversant constitutional lawyers. But it is likely
that, at any given time, the set of propositions that are uncontroversially regarded as
constitutional will be arranged along this continuum.
46 My own view, for what it is worth, is that the text of the Constitution cannot reasonably be read to direct either the rule that the State of Michigan may not abridge the
freedom of speech or the rule that Congress may not segregate public schools by race,
even on a “soft textualist” understanding of what the text might say. The better understanding of the relationship of these rules to the text is that the rule arises from sources
outside the text and is then associated with a portion of the text that addresses some related subject. That process of association might be described as a species of textualism,
but if so, it is not what the big-C conception means by textualism because the text is not
operating as the basis of the rule’s constitutional status. See Primus, 32 Harv J L & Pub
Pol at 167 (cited in note 20) (“If textualism has a core, it is the proposition that the text
of the law has meaning and authority independent of what the judges have said and
done.”).
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2. Supremacy.
In this analysis, the statement that a rule operates as supreme law means that either or both of the following two things
is true:
(1) Actions violating that rule are reliably nullified, punished, or redressed by some institutional authority whose
actions in this regard are not subject to override by some
other institutional decisionmaker.47
(2) Nobody with the capacity to violate the rule attempts to
do so, even when it would be in their interests, because all
such actors regard themselves as being under the authority
of a rule.
Rules that are regularly enforced by courts exercising the
power of judicial review exemplify the first condition. If the government tried to censor this Article because it disagreed with
the views expressed here, any court in the land would issue an
injunction against the censorship. A good example of a rule that
is (or was) supreme on the strength of the second condition was
the rule, prior to 1940, that presidents should retire after serving two terms. Between George Washington and Franklin Roosevelt, presidents seem to have considered themselves obligated
to step aside at the end of their second terms, and informed analysts accordingly described the two-term limit as a rule of constitutional law.48
As the preceding example demonstrates, a determined constitutional entrepreneur can sometimes overcome or eliminate a
rule of supreme law by declining to recognize its authority and
getting away with it. If someone denies the authority of a rule
that previous people in the same position felt themselves governed by, and if no other actor steps in to enforce the rule, the
rule is no longer supreme because neither of the two conditions
any longer obtains. President Roosevelt’s successful breach of
the norm indicated that the rule did not in fact operate as

47 By an “institutional decisionmaker,” I mean a court, a legislature, or some other
form of regularly operating body. I mean to exclude episodic decisionmaking processes
like those involved in adopting formal constitutional amendments.
48 See, for example, William Bennett Munro, The Makers of the Unwritten Constitution 17–18 (Macmillan 1930); Tiedeman, The Unwritten Constitution at 51–53 (cited in
note 11); Llewellyn, 34 Colum L Rev at 14 (cited in note 16).
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supreme law. Note, however, that President Roosevelt’s innovation demonstrated only that the two-term limit did not function
as supreme law in 1940, when Roosevelt ran for his third term.
The fact that the limit was not supreme law in 1940 does not tell
us whether it operated as supreme law in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. Whether the norm operated as supreme law at those times depends on the operative practices of
those times, and it does seem that people treated the two-term
limit as supreme law before President Roosevelt challenged the
norm.
Note that these two conditions for a rule’s operating as supreme law are independent of each other. Sometimes both exist
at the same time: any court would block governmental censorship of this Article, but nobody expects such judicial intervention
to be necessary, because government officials generally recognize that trying to censor speech would be a violation of authoritative rules and do not try to exercise censorial powers even
when they dearly wish that some form of unwelcome speech
would go away. That said, either of the two conditions can exist
without the other, and either one is sufficient to demonstrate
that a rule is operating as supreme law.
3. Article V entrenchment.
Article V provides that the Constitution can only be changed
by a formal supermajoritarian process requiring action by Congress and ratification by three-fourths of the states.49 Most practitioners recognize, however, that the operative rules of constitutional law can also be changed by other mechanisms,
prominently including a majority vote of the Supreme Court.
Several theorists have persuasively argued that most change to
American constitutional law over the course of the last two hundred years has come without Article V amendments.50 In practice, therefore, many rules that the bundled big-C vision imagines as Article V entrenched have turned out not to be so.51 To be
sure, one might contend that constitutional change without Article V amendment is illegitimate or, more softly, that it works
49

US Const Art V.
See, for example, Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the People: Foundations 44–57 (Belknap
1991); David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 Harv L Rev
1457, 1457–59 (2001); Llewellyn, 34 Colum L Rev at 21–23 (cited in note 16).
51 One could also characterize President Roosevelt’s running for and winning a
third term as a change to a constitutional rule through a mechanism other than Article V.
50
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changes only in “constitutional doctrine” or “constitutional law,”
each conceived as something different from the Constitution itself.52 For the reasons previously explained, however, I will move
past these scruples. As always in this Article, the focus is on how
the constitutional system actually functions.53
To decide that a rule is Article V entrenched in practice, one
would have to conclude that there is no process less demanding
than Article V amendment that could change the rule. That is a
difficult judgment to render in advance about most constitutional rules, especially if one internalizes deeply the point that farreaching constitutional change has in fact occurred without Article V amendment, including change that people situated ex
ante might have thought could never occur without such
amendments. Prior to the twentieth century, well-socialized
American lawyers might have thought that, unless the Constitution were amended, constitutional law could not possibly authorize Congress to enact pervasive economic regulations, to delegate broad power to administrative agencies, or to prohibit
racial discrimination in privately owned businesses. All those
things turned out to be possible without amendments. The
Eighteenth Amendment testifies eloquently to one age’s conviction that Article V was the means for accomplishing what another age could accomplish by federal statute, were it inclined to
do so. In the twenty-first century, when the Controlled Substances Act is valid Commerce Clause legislation,54 there is little
reason to doubt that a federal statute banning the sale of alcohol
would be similarly upheld.
Perhaps it is unwise, therefore, to conclude that any rule is
Article V entrenched for all time. If enough members of the decisionmaking class come to view an issue differently in the future
from the way it is understood now, constitutional change might
be accomplished by other means. When prevailing opinion
moves far enough to ratify an Article V amendment, the same
climate of opinion tends to foster changed intuitions about how
to read the existing constitutional text. By the time amendment

52 See, for example, Levinson, Constitutional Faith at 30–37 (cited in note 6) (describing this view).
53 Within that framework, the idea of a metaphysically correct constitutional rule
that differs from operative doctrine is in one respect consequential: sometimes that idea
motivates practitioners, some of whom might be judges, to work a change in the operative law.
54 See Gonzales v Raich, 545 US 1, 22 (2005).
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is feasible, therefore, it may no longer be necessary.55 Consider,
as an example, the way that sex equality emerged as a broadly
accepted tenet of equal protection doctrine at roughly the same
time that the proposed Equal Rights Amendment was close to
ratification.56 The switch in time of 1937 provides other canonical examples, including a change in the scope of Congress’s
enumerated powers57 and a change in the meaning of the property rights protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.58
The categorization of a given rule as Article V entrenched is
therefore better understood as a judgment about the foreseeable
future than as a judgment about the rule per se. In practice, Article V states the rule of entrenchment for those rules that, at
the relevant time, are more easily changed by amendment than
otherwise. Whether Article V is an easy or hard route to change
relative to other possible mechanisms will vary over time with
the state of opinion in the decisionmaking class. Sometimes it is
easier to get the Court to change than it is to pass an amendment, and sometimes the opposite is true. Understood in this
light, describing a rule as Article V entrenched means that we
do not foresee the Supreme Court’s reading the Constitution in a
way that alters the existing rule, nor do we foresee the Court’s
acquiescing if the other branches struck out in that direction.
It is tempting to qualify the foregoing framework with the
following proviso: for rules where the text is especially clear, Article V amendment is the only possible route to change. It is
hard to imagine, for example, that any mechanism other than
Article V could change the length of the president’s term from
four years to three. That said, attention to historical examples of
unanticipated change should encourage humility even with respect to a prediction like this one. Part of what makes it easy to
assume that the president’s term could not change without an
Article V amendment is that the issue of presidential term
length is not, in our experience, a matter of controversy. If large
numbers of American officials came to believe that the four-year
55 See, for example, Primus, 109 Mich L Rev at 99–100 (cited in note 25); Strauss,
114 Harv L Rev at 1462–63 (cited in note 50).
56 See Frontiero v Richardson, 411 US 677, 687–88 (1973) (discussing the relationship between questions of sex equality under the Fourteenth Amendment and the thenpending Equal Rights Amendment).
57 See NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 US 1, 30 (1937) (upholding provisions of the National Labor Relations Act as valid exercises of Congress’s commerce power).
58 See West Coast Hotel Co v Parrish, 300 US 379, 391, 398–99 (1937) (upholding
minimum wage legislation).
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term was seriously flawed, pressure might mount to find ways to
read the Constitution to solve the problem. In the absence of
such pressure, the idea that the Constitution could be read to
permit something other than a four-year term is likely to seem
absurd. Maybe it would seem absurd under any circumstances;
if I had to guess, I would hazard that the Republic will fall before the length of the president’s term changes without a formal
amendment. But assuming that the substantive issue will not be
controversial in our lifetimes, we may never know whether the
text could be read differently.59 The point, in any case, is this:
59 We may never know, for example, if it could be read like this: Article II, Section 1
says that the president “. . . shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years.” We have
read “during the Term of four Years” to mean “for a four-year term.” But as a matter of
ordinary language, something that happens “during” a specified time need not occupy
the entirety of the time specified. Thanksgiving happens “during” November, but November is a longer period of time than Thanksgiving. So if the president were to serve a
three-year term, he would hold his office “during the Term of four Years”—just not for
the entirety of that period. Once this possible reading is in view, we should notice that
the Constitution’s language describing the term lengths of other elected officials is different from that of Article II. Article I specifies that members of the House of Representatives shall be chosen “every second Year.” Article II does not provide that presidential
elections shall be held “every fourth year,” though obviously it could, so the difference
suggests that the timetable for presidential elections is more variable than that for
House elections. And with respect to the Senate, both Article I and the Seventeenth
Amendment provide that Senators shall be elected “for six years.” That straightforward
formulation indicates that the Constitution knows how to specify a concrete term length
when it wants to do so. Article II could have said that the president would be elected “for
four years,” but it doesn’t. It sets a limit by saying that the term shall be “during” four
years. Presumably, therefore, the president’s length of service could be set at something
shorter than four years, say by the terms of a statute passed under Congress’s power to
make laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested in the
federal government.
In the world of constitutional interpretation in the year 2013, the preceding argument is completely implausible (as would be any other argument for a presidential term
lasting more or less than four years). We all know that “during the Term of four Years”
in Article II means “for four years.” And we aren’t wrong. What we do not and cannot
know is whether our successors would share our conviction on that point, if somehow
they came to believe urgently that the good of the Republic required presidents to serve
shorter terms. Under that pressure, they might sincerely understand the text differently
from us—whether in accordance with the interpretation I have sketched above or in
some other way that I do not presently imagine, as we today accept readings of the Constitution that would have been implausible to our predecessors generations ago.
My willingness to guess that the length of the presidential term will not change
without formal amendment thus does not rely only on the text of Article II. It also relies
on the fact of visible, salient, consistent practice. We all have lived experience of the
four-year cycle, and we all know that it goes all the way back to the beginning. Accordingly, everyone would recognize a new textual interpretation as a change. And given how
thoroughly and unambiguously Americans are aware that the four-year term has been
consistent from the beginning, everyone would probably understand that change as a
new departure rather than as the recovery of a correct but now-lost reading. That the
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given how many once-absurd readings of the Constitution have
become judicial doctrine, respect for the adaptability of our successors should prompt us to qualify even our most confident intuitions about what the text could not possibly accommodate.
4. Judicial review.
If the judiciary has in fact enforced some rule with an exercise of judicial review, I will take it as established that that rule
can be adduced as an example of something to which judicial review attaches. To reduce controversy, I will draw examples from
exercises of judicial review whose legitimacy is not the subject of
heated current debate.
For all the reasons that negatives are hard to prove, it is
more difficult to demonstrate that a particular rule is not enforceable through judicial review. Even if the Supreme Court declares an issue not fit for judicial resolution today, a somewhat
different presentation of the issue might provoke the Court to
assert itself tomorrow.60 But with that caveat duly noted, I will
take the Court’s statements about nonjusticiability as guides to
what competent practitioners should reasonably understand
about the practice that currently exists. When I go beyond that
boundary in characterizing something as nonjusticiable, I will
try to limit myself to strongly supportable intuitions and to note
the limits of what can be predicted.
B.

Unbundling

The next page contains a four-by-four table depicting all of
the possible ways in which text, supremacy, Article V entrenchment, and judicial review can be pulled apart. Some of the boxes
in the table require little elucidation, and others call for considerably more. In what follows, I discuss the possible combinations
in order, beginning in the top-left corner and moving down the
columns, skipping the four boxes that are not applicable for obvious logical reasons. The point of the exercise is to show that—
four-year term is visible, salient, and has been consistently practiced would thus make it
more difficult for constitutional entrepreneurs to propose alternatives to the relevant
text of Article II than to propose alternative readings of other texts that are no more
“clear” as a matter of pure textual interpretation.
60 For a canonical example, contrast Colegrove v Green, 328 US 549, 552 (1946) (declaring nonjusticiable a challenge to an electoral districting plan), with Baker v Carr, 369
US 186, 208–10 (1962) (declaring such a challenge justiciable when presented as an
equal protection claim rather than a Guarantee Clause claim).
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with one exception—a rule with one or more of these characteristics might or might not have any of the others.
FIGURE 1
In the Text

Supreme Law

Article V
Entrenched
●The president
may not order
military
personnel to
attend Catholic
Mass just
before battle.

Judicial
Review
●Congress may
not segregate
schools by race.
●States are
immune from
damage actions
brought by
their own
citizens.

But Not in the
Text

n/a

But Not
Supreme Law

●Mandatory
jury trial in
criminal cases.
●Six-year
Senate term
(for new
states).
●Presidential
presentment of
proposed
amendments.

●Congress may
not move
Election Day
for partisan
reasons.
●States must
permit popular
voting in
presidential
elections.
n/a

●Mandatory
jury trial in
criminal cases.
●6-year Senate
term (for new
states).
●Presidential
presentment of
proposed
amendments.

●Exclusionary
rule.
●Dormant
commerce
restrictions.
●Constitutional
default rules
generally.

But
Changeable
without Art V
Amendment

●None
(actually
bundled).

●Holdings of
Roe v Wade
and Citizens
United v FEC.
●Two-term
presidential
limit prior to
1940.

n/a

●Constitutional
default rules.
●Holdings of
Roe v Wade
and Citizens
United v FEC.

But Not
Enforceable
through
Judicial
Review

●Political
questions.

●Two-term
presidential
limit prior to
1940.
●Supreme
Court has nine
members.

●Supreme
Court has nine
members.

n/a

1. Text without supremacy.
We start at one of the hardest points, so the explanation of
this box will take considerably more space than the explanation
of any other box.
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Many earlier commentators have noticed that a great deal
of American constitutional law rests on nontextual foundations.61 But most of them have maintained that the text is simply underinclusive of the operative content of constitutional law.
On that view, constitutional law contains things that are not in
the text, but everything in the text is respected as constitutional law.62
The idea that every rule stated in the text of the Constitution is a constitutional rule makes sense at the level of labels. It
is entirely ordinary to use the term “constitutional” to describe
any rule stated in the Constitution. It does not follow, however,
that all rules stated in the text enjoy the payoffs that might flow
from constitutional status. As is germane to the box under discussion, several rules stated in the constitutional text are not
treated as supreme law. They are routinely ignored and violated.
Before giving examples of these nonsupreme (and indeed
non-operative) rules, it is worth noting again that my view relies
on a willingness to limit the range of meanings that can be attributed to a text. It is possible to maintain that every rule contained in a text is followed, so long as one is willing to read the
text in whatever nonstandard way is necessary to make that
text match prevailing practice. Just as the community of constitutional interpreters has found creative ways to locate previously nontextual ideas within the constitutional text, it can find
ways to read out of the text any rules that do not conform to accepted constitutional law.63
It is a normal dynamic of American constitutional interpretation that people struggle to close the gap between the text and
the set of rules that are recognized as entitled to supremacy, entrenchment, and judicial review.64 Pressure to generate readings
61 See Strauss, The Living Constitution at 34–35 (cited in note 12); Black, Structure
and Relationship at 11, 29–32 (cited in note 32); Grey, 27 Stan L Rev at 706–07 (cited in
note 7); Llewellyn, 34 Colum L Rev at 3–5 (cited in note 16).
62 See, for example, Grey, 37 Stan L Rev at 1–3 (cited in note 8) (identifying nontextualists as “supplementers” because their position is that constitutional authority includes more than just the text).
63 See generally Pamela S. Karlan and Daniel R. Ortiz, Constitutional Farce, in
William N. Eskridge Jr and Sanford Levinson, eds, Constitutional Stupidities, Constitutional Tragedies 180 (NYU 1998) (arguing that the conventions of constitutional argument are sufficiently flexible so that it is always possible to articulate an interpretation
that would avoid an unwanted outcome).
64 See Michael C. Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds Out the Extraconstitutional Rule of Recognition, in Matthew D. Adler and Kenneth Einar Himma, eds, The
Rule of Recognition and the U.S. Constitution 69, 69–83, 86–87 (Oxford 2009) (discussing
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under which the text contains no ignored rules starts to build as
soon as people realize that we presently lack canonical explanations for why rules that an untutored reader might (easily) find
in the text are really not there at all. My claim, then, is simply
that competent readers of English who do not know the practice
that the text is supposed to match would find in the text several
rules that are not followed in practice.
Here are three examples.
1) Trial by jury in criminal trials. Article III provides as follows: “The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury . . . .”65 In practice, many criminal trials in Article III courts take place without juries. To be sure, defendants
may demand jury trials if they wish.66 But defendants are also
routinely permitted to choose bench trials if they would prefer to
be tried by judges.67 The text of Article III, however, is written in
inflexible terms: “The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury.”
It is not hard to understand why practice departs from the
text on this point. We understand jury trial mostly as a measure
for the protection of defendants, and nothing strikes us as bizarre or upsetting about a bench trial if the defendant prefers to
proceed that way. State courts routinely hold bench trials, so our
general sense of what makes a trial a trial accommodates trial
by judge as well as trial by jury. To insist on a jury trial over a
defendant’s objection might seem otiose, not to mention cumbersome and expensive. To be sure, one could imagine a regime that
regarded jury trial as sufficiently important as to be nonwaivable by the defendant. Indeed, the untutored reader of Article
III would think that the United States Constitution establishes
such a regime. But it seems not to. For generations, Article III
courts have held bench trials with the consent of defendants.
That dominant practice has shaped what I have elsewhere
called our constitutional expectations.68 And as often happens,
our constitutional expectations have the power to divert our attention from the words in the text.

the tendency to shoehorn nontextual norms into arguments about the Constitution’s
text).
65 US Const Art III, § 2, cl 3.
66 See, for example, United States v Gaudin, 515 US 506, 511 (1995).
67 See, for example, United States v Hanjuan Jin, 833 F Supp 2d 977, 980 (ND Ill
2012) (bench trial); United States v Weaks, 840 F Supp 2d 12, 17 (DDC 2012) (bench
trial).
68 Primus, 109 Mich L Rev at 93–94 (cited in note 25).
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The words are still there, of course, in every printed copy of
the Constitution. It should therefore be a straightforward matter to say that the text of the Constitution announces, as a rule,
that criminal trials in Article III courts must be jury trials. But
no such rule operates as supreme law in the United States.
2) Six-year Senate term for new states. Article I and the
Seventeenth Amendment both specify that US senators are
elected for six-year terms.69 That is in fact the operative rule for
most senators. But think about the seventy-eight senators comprising the initial delegations from states admitted to the Union
after the First Congress convened. Those thirty-nine states—
that is, the thirty-seven that were not signatories to the Declaration of Independence plus North Carolina and Rhode Island,
both of which ratified the Constitution only after the First Congress was sitting—became eligible to elect senators at a whole
range of points on the calendar and in odd-numbered as well as
even-numbered years. Their initial senators were all elected for
lengths of time that would integrate them into the electoral cycle on which one-third of the Senate begins a new six-year term
every two years. From Samuel Johnston of North Carolina, who
was elected for a three-year term, to Hiram Fong of Hawaii,
whose initial term was four and a half years, those senators
have been elected for a whole variety of term lengths corresponding to nothing that appears in the text of the Constitution.70
This approach to senatorial terms for new states is reasonable. It is in some ways simpler, perhaps more elegant, and maybe in modern times less expensive for senators to be elected in
three big groups than to have Senate seats up for reelection at
dozens of different dates, corresponding to the many points in
the six-year cycle at which each new state sent its first senators.
But the reigning approach is not prescribed by the text. Indeed,
it contradicts the text, which states that each senator is elected
for a six-year term.71 And although the existing system is reasonable, it is not the only way that the situation could be handled. It is perfectly conceivable to imagine senatorial elections
occurring on a rolling basis rather than in big batches every two
69

US Const Art I, § 3, cl 1; US Const Amend XVII.
I thank Louis Seidman for pointing out this example to me. See Louis Michael
Seidman, Acontextual Judicial Review, 32 Cardozo L Rev 1143, 1153–54 & n 47 (2011).
71 US Const Amend VXII. One could read US Const Art I, § 3, cl 2 to mean that the
two senators comprising each state’s initial delegation should serve terms of different
lengths, but the only options for length of term given in the text are two years, four
years, and six years. No text authorizes a three-year term or a four-and-a-half-year term.
70
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years. The Senate already considers itself a “continuing body”
rather than one whose business stops and starts as each class is
elected.72 A rolling electoral calendar might bring reality more in
line with that conception.
The point here is not that we would be better off if senators
were elected at times scattered through the calendar than we
are under the present system. It might be better and it might be
worse. The point is merely that the existing system declines to
implement a clearly stated textual rule and that we should not
rationalize the departure on the ground that strict compliance
with the text would be crazy or impossible. It wouldn’t. We simply have a practice, reasonable on its own terms and sanctioned
by tradition stretching back to the beginning, of overriding the
term-length rule that is stated in the text.73
This example of accepted practice contradicting constitutional text is noteworthy because the violated text is of a kind
that the literature generally assumes to be reliably and strictly
observed. Even leading nontextualists generally write as if some
constitutional texts are reliably treated as supreme and unambiguous law, and the most common illustrations of such texts
are numerical rules stating either age qualifications for holding
office or the length of time for which officeholders are elected.74
This is not quite so. Even in the supposed heartland of textual
rules, the text does not always state the operative constitutional
rule.
3) Presidential presentment of proposed amendments. The
second Presentment Clause of Article I, § 7, states that
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence
of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary
72 See generally Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Burying the “Continuing Body” Theory of
the Senate, 95 Iowa L Rev 1401 (2010) (describing and criticizing this conception).
73 To be sure, and in contrast to the example about jury trial under Article III, this
textual rule has not been overridden in more than fifty years. But it has been consistently overridden whenever the occasion has presented itself, and it would be overridden
again in the future if a new state were to be admitted.
74 See, for example, David A. Strauss, On the Origin of Rules (with Apologies to
Darwin): A Comment on Antonin Scalia’s The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 75 U Chi L
Rev 997, 1006 (2008):

There are provisions of the Constitution that do prescribe rules or, in any
event, that do not leave much room for discretion. There are provisions that
use numbers, for example—for the minimum ages of federal officials, for those
officials’ terms in office, for the number of senators per state, and for how often
a census is to be conducted—and at least the numerical aspects of those rules,
read naturally, do not permit the exercise of much discretion.
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(except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to
the President of the United States; and before the Same
shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate
and House of Representatives.75
Like the jury trial clause, the Presentment Clause speaks in totalizing and mandatory terms. Every order, resolution, or vote of
Congress shall require presidential approval (or a congressional
override of the president’s veto) in order to become effective.
In practice, however, some prominent congressional orders,
resolutions, and votes go into effect without being either signed
by the president or repassed by Congress. Notably, Congress
proposes constitutional amendments by the joint resolution of
both Houses,76 and proposed amendments do not go through the
presentment procedure. Amendments go into effect upon ratification by the states, with no stop at the president’s desk.77
Again, the rule stated in the text does not seem to operate as
supreme law.78
As noted before, my claim—that certain practices whose
propriety is taken for granted in American law affirmatively
contradict rules stated in the text of the Constitution—may not

75

US Const Art I, § 7, cl 3.
The text provides for amendments to be proposed either by joint supermajority
resolution in Congress or by a convention that Congress shall call on the application of
two-thirds of the state legislatures. See US Const Art V. Only the supermajority resolution has ever been implemented to adopt an actual amendment, so the discussion above
is limited to that version of the process.
77 To be precise, twenty-six of twenty-seven amendments have skipped presidential
presentment. The sole exception is the Thirteenth Amendment, which President Lincoln
did sign before it was sent to the states for ratification.
78 Early litigation under the Eleventh Amendment brought this issue to the Supreme Court, which conspicuously failed to provide a textual explanation for the practice. In Hollingsworth v Virginia, 3 US 378 (1798), one of the claims the Court confronted
was precisely that the Eleventh Amendment was invalid because it had not complied
with the presentment requirement. Justice Samuel Chase provided the Court’s sole response to this contention as follows: “There can, surely, be no necessity to answer that
argument. The negative of the President applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation:
He has nothing to do with the proposition, or adoption, of amendments to the Constitution.” Id at 381. Justice Chase’s dictum states the operative supreme law perfectly, and it
makes not the slightest gesture toward explaining how the text could be read to accord
with that supreme law. More recently, the Supreme Court of Wyoming has interpreted
the language of the Wyoming Constitution’s presentment requirement, whose wording is
in relevant part identical to that of Article V, to invalidate a proposed amendment that
was not presented to the governor. See Geringer v Bebout, 10 P3d 514, 523 (Wyo 2000).
The Supreme Court of Wyoming charitably described the US Supreme Court’s reasoning
in Hollingsworth as “not contained in that Court’s decision.” Id.
76
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persuade all readers. In part because enterprising interpreters
can find ways to read the Constitution to mean things that people had not previously understood it to mean, it seems likely
that the Constitution could be read to be consistent with prevailing practice on the points I have raised. To be clear, I am not
endorsing the position that the text might mean anything. To
use Don Herzog’s example, I doubt that the Constitution could
be read as the story of a small boy growing up in Kansas during
the Great Depression.79 I mean instead to make an observation
about our capacity to read the Constitution to mean the sort of
things that we believe it would make sense for it to mean—to
accord, that is, with our constitutional expectations. Thus, the
reason why a skilled and dogged textualist should be able to
generate the interpretations he needs to persuade himself (and
others) that the text of the Constitution does not contain the
rules I adduce above is only partly a matter of the indeterminacy of textual meaning. It is also a function of the fact that
properly socialized Americans believe that defendants should be
able to waive jury trials, that one-third of the whole Senate
should be elected every two years, and that the First Amendment is a valid part of the Constitution.
It is not hard to imagine what such readings might look
like. Indeed, it is fun to engage in the exercise of trying to generate them.80 The important point, though, is that no such readings
79 Don Herzog, As Many as Six Impossible Things before Breakfast, 75 Cal L Rev
609, 629 (1987).
80 Here are some examples:
(1) One might deny that Article III makes jury trial mandatory in criminal cases by
mobilizing the word “right” in the language of the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees
criminal defendants “the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” This use of the term
“right,” the textualist might say, indicates that the accused has the option of a trial. To
be sure, the term “right” does not always describe an option, see generally Richard A.
Primus, The American Language of Rights (Cambridge 1999), but the term does bear
that meaning often enough to make such a reading of the Sixth Amendment plausible as
a prima facie matter. One could then privilege that interpretation of the Sixth Amendment over the apparent plain meaning of Article III in either of two ways. First, one
could say that the Sixth Amendment overrides Article III wherever the two conflict because the Sixth Amendment was adopted two years later. See Schick v United States,
195 US 65, 68–69 (1904) (endorsing this reading in dicta). Alternatively, one could say
that the two clauses should be read to reflect the same basic idea, that any conflict between them should be resolved by giving each clause a reasonable rather than a literal
meaning, and that the apparently inflexible language of Article III is reasonably read
just as a way of emphasizing the importance of the jury trial right. As I have described
elsewhere, we can think of these two reconciliations as reflecting hard-textualist and
soft-textualist approaches, respectively, where the hard textualist insists on a close reading
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of the words and the soft textualist argues that one should not read literally what is
meant to be read reasonably. As it happens, the Supreme Court long ago chose a softtextualist reconciliation on this point. See Patton v United States, 281 US 276, 298–99
(1930) (holding that the mandatory language of Article III could not actually have been
intended to make jury trial mandatory). In my own view, neither of these readings
makes sufficient sense of the text. Given the normal practice of disfavoring implied repeal of constitutional text, it would make more sense to read the Sixth Amendment as
guaranteeing that the accused’s (mandatory) jury trial would be speedy and public, and
that the jury would be impartial and local, rather than as sub silentio jettisoning the requirement of jury trial stated in Article III. But the fact that a reading is textually less
sensible than some other reading does not guarantee that that reading will not emerge
as the official account of a constitutional practice, especially when that practice is of generally accepted validity.
(2) One might reconcile the practice of varied term lengths for a state’s inaugural
senators by describing the election of such a senator as the filling of a vacancy rather
than as an election of its own. Article I, § 3 is reasonably read to imply that senators
elected to fill vacancies should not serve full six-year terms but instead should serve only
as long as is necessary to effectuate the policy “that one third [of all senators] may be
chosen every second Year.” US Const Art I, § 3, cl 2. To be sure, it may seem odd to think
of election to a new office as the filling of a vacancy. Both as a matter of ordinary language and in the context of § 3, “vacancy” seems to refer to the condition that obtains
when an existing office lacks an occupant, and the inaugural senators from new states
have generally not assumed offices that ever existed in that empty state. Instead, these
senators have generally taken office immediately upon the states’ admission to the Union, such that the office is occupied as soon as it comes into existence. (The selection of
officeholders has taken place before the effective date of admission precisely so as to
avoid leaving the seats “vacant.”) And for what it may be worth, early interpreters seem
to have thought that a “vacancy” in the context of Article II could arise only when an incumbent departed the position. See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James McHenry
(May 3, 1799), in Harold C. Syrett, ed, 23 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 94, 94 (Columbia 1976) (“Vacancy . . . presupposes that the Office has been once filled.”); Edmund
Randolph, Opinion on Recess Appointments (July 7, 1792), in John Catanzariti, ed, 24
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 165, 165–66 (Princeton 1990). I doubt that this problem
would prevent committed textualists from judging, sincerely, that the vacancy exception
is a valid textual ground for the practice: again, our constitutional expectations do a lot
to make otherwise-awkward textual interpretations seem perfectly reasonable. I note,
however, that if the terms of inaugural senators were intended to comply with the constitutional text by virtue of the vacancy exception, one might expect new states to observe a convention of leaving the seat unoccupied for a day, or even an hour, before filling it. No such convention exists, in part because no one has bothered to invoke the
vacancy-filling idea as a means of reconciling this practice with the text. As with the
waiver of jury trial, the prevailing practice is simply to do something that seems intuitively sensible and not to mind, or even notice, that the text says something else.
(3) One could argue that the presentment procedures make no sense as applied to
proposed constitutional amendments because the necessary vote for congressional approval of such proposals—two-thirds of each house—is the same as that required to overcome a veto. See US Const Art I, § 7. If one assumes that Congress could override any
veto of a proposed amendment, one might think that insisting on presentment is pointless. But as experienced lawmakers know, the fact that one can muster the support to
pass something once does not always mean that one has enough support to pass the
same thing twice, even with the same legislature in place, so this argument does not
quite establish what it purports to even on its own terms. Alternatively, one could argue
that the requirements of Article I, § 7 do not apply to Article V amendments because
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are now part of the shared consciousness of American constitutional practitioners. Reconciling readings of the text would be
called into existence and made conventional only as a way of resolving the dissonance that people would experience if the mismatch between prevailing practice and an untutored reading of
the text were brought into the foreground. As long as that mismatch remains out of sight, there is constitutional text that does
not function as supreme law. More generally, we should be
aware that our inclination to see instances of non-operative constitutional text as few and marginal is predicated on our willingness to forgo reading constitutional clauses in ways that they
surely could be read as a matter of textual interpretation. The
Sixth Amendment’s statement that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury”81 could easily be read to mean that
the right to jury trial attaches in (not to put too fine a point on
it) all criminal prosecutions. We don’t read it that way; we understand the jury trial guarantee to exclude petty offenses, even
when denominated criminal.82 Without the power and widespread acceptance of many reconciling readings like that one,
inoperative constitutional text would be more pervasive.83
Article V states its own conditions for the validity of measures enacted thereunder. If
those conditions are exclusive, the presentment requirement of Article I would not apply.
One problem with this argument, though, is that the language of Article I seems totalizing. It provides that “Every” measure to which both Houses must agree must be presented. Note too that congressional enactments under all other articles of the Constitution—
not just those enacted under Article I—are treated as if the Presentment Clause meant
what it says. Congressional reorganizations of the judiciary under Article III must be
presented to the president, as must measures exercising the various powers given to
Congress in Article IV (that is, the power to prescribe interstate comity under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, the power to admit new states, and the power to make rules
governing federal territory and disposing of federal property). Statutes adopted under
the enforcement clauses of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, TwentyFourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments are treated as subject to the presentment requirements of Article I, as is the exercise of the substantive congressional powers conferred in the Sixteenth, Twentieth, Twenty-Third, and Twenty-Fifth Amendments. (The
joker in the deck is congressional confirmations as specified in the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, namely the confirmation of a new vice president and the decision as to
whether a disabled president is fit to resume office; to date, there is scant practice under
these provisions, and it is easy to imagine presidents skipping signatures in both situations.) Considered in this context, a claim that Article V is exempt resembles special
pleading—which, again, does not mean that the argument would not be persuasive to a
motivated audience.
81 US Const Amend VI.
82 See Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145, 159–61 (1968).
83 Some interpreters identify certain constitutional texts as failing to operate as
supreme law precisely because they endorse readings of the text that are not obvious to
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2. Text and formal entrenchment.
We come now to the one combination of constitutional elements that does seem to travel in a bundle all the time. If a rule
appears in the text of the Constitution, the statement of the
rule—not the content of the rule or its practical operation, but
the textual statement of the rule—cannot be changed except by
Article V amendment. To be sure, the content of the rule might
change. In practice, the content of textual rules sometimes
changes without formal amendments, often as a result of developments in judicial doctrine. “[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause”84 is a rule that has been understood to permit
at some times what it has prohibited at others, even though the
text of the rule has not been changed.85 What does not change
except by Article V amendment is the words of the Constitution
itself.86 The fact that the text does not change except by amendment has consequences for constitutional law even if the entrenchment of the text does not guarantee entrenchment of any
particular content. The text is an important and easily mobilized
resource in constitutional argument, and the set of persuasive
all other readers. Professor Ernest Young, for example, regards the prevailing permissive doctrine toward congressional delegations to administrative agencies as abrogating
the Vesting Clause of Article I, which states that “All legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.” See Young, 117 Yale L J at 446–47
(cited in note 11). It is not clear, of course, that a nondelegation rule must be read into
those words: that a power is vested in Pablo might say nothing about whether he may
authorize Tyrone to exercise the power as his agent. (My edition of Black’s Law Dictionary specifies that a “vested estate” includes a right of alienation. See Black’s Law Dictionary 809 (abridged 5th ed 1983).) Professor Young reads the Vesting Clause as he
reads it, though, and on his reading delegation is prohibited, which means that in his
view Article I, § 1 should be added to the list of constitutional texts that do not operate
as supreme law. The point, of course, is simply that the extent to which we recognize
nonsupreme constitutional text is a function of how assiduously we conform our sense of
the right readings of the text to the practice that actually prevails.
84 US Const Amend IV.
85 Contrast, for example, Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643, 655–57 (1961) (excluding evidence gathered in warrantless search), with Wolf v Colorado, 338 US 25, 33 (1949) (permitting the admission of such evidence).
86 Or at least it never has so far; one can generate far-flung hypothetical circumstances in which such change might be possible. To date, however, it does describe American constitutional practice well to say that the text itself changes only with formal
amendments. One might also add the caveat that whether the Constitution has been
formally amended as prescribed in Article V is itself sometimes a contestable question.
See, for example, Bruce Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformations 197–98 (Belknap
1998) (raising doubts about whether the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in accordance with Article V’s requirements); Laurence H. Tribe, The Invisible Constitution xix–
xx (Oxford 2008) (describing controversy over whether the Twenty-Seventh Amendment
was validly adopted).
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arguments that are easily made would shift if the text were to
change. That said, the fact that text and formal entrenchment
are authentically bundled together is less consequential on this
understanding than it would be if entrenching the text were tantamount to entrenching the content of an operative rule of law.
3. Text without judicial review.
This separation is well known under the heading of the political question doctrine. To take one of the classic examples, the
text contains a rule stating that the United States will guarantee each state a republican form of government.87 Courts will not
enforce the rule.88
4. Supremacy without text.
The text of Article I empowers Congress to set the date on
which congressional elections are held,89 and the text of Article
II empowers state legislatures to decide how each state’s presidential electors will be appointed.90 As a matter of plain reading,
these authorizations permit legislators to pursue their partisan
interests far beyond the point where American officeholders feel
themselves required to stop acting in a partisan fashion. What
restrains their pursuit of partisan interest is the sense that it
would violate the rules.
Consider Congress first. If both Houses of Congress had majorities of the same political party, and assuming also a friendly
president or veto-proof supermajorities, Congress could set the
date of each federal election in a way calculated to maximize the
chances that the party in power would prevail. Maybe the incumbents would do better if elections were held in June, when
the economy will probably be good, than in November, when
things might have gone sour. The national legislatures of other
democracies engage in such gamesmanship regularly,91 but
87

See US Const Art IV, § 4.
See Luther v Borden, 48 US 1, 42 (1849). As noted earlier, statements about
what courts will not do are limited by our inability to foresee all the ways in which the
future might be different from the past. See Part I.A.4. Perhaps under some future circumstance a court would in fact enforce the Guarantee Clause. What we can say now is
that prevailing doctrine includes a principle against the judicial enforcement of that
Clause and that courts to date have conformed, at least officially, to that doctrine.
89 US Const Art I, § 4, cl 1.
90 US Const Art II, § 1, cl 2.
91 See, for example, Fixed-Term Parliaments Bill, 515 Parl Deb, HC (6th ser) 621
(2010); Robert Hazell, Fixed Term Parliaments 5, 10–15 (UCL 2010); Peers End Deadlock
88
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Congress never does, even at a time in history when the parties
seem bent on extracting every possible bit of partisan advantage
in other ways.
Similarly, state legislatures might allocate electoral votes by
themselves, rather than risking the possibility that the citizenelectorate might vote for the other party’s presidential candidate. In Michigan, both houses of the legislature presently have
Republican majorities and the governor is a Republican. In the
last presidential election, Michigan’s electoral votes went to the
Democratic candidate, and predictably so. The text of Article II
indicates that the legislature was not required to permit that
outcome. It could have chosen, months before the election, to
award Michigan’s electoral votes according to its own partisan
preference. But well-socialized Americans know that, no matter
what the text says, there are no foreseeable circumstances in
which a state legislature would eliminate popular voting for
presidential electors. Indeed, it would not happen even if doing
so would yield the enormous political prize of changing the outcome of a presidential election.92
Actions like these are close to unthinkable because the relevant officeholders understand themselves as bound to respect a
certain set of rules, rules that legislatures cannot alter on their
own authority.93 But neither rule is present in the text. On the
over Fixed Term Parliaments (BBC News Sept 14, 2011), online at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-14924982 (visited Sept 11, 2013).
92 In recent years, a few legislators have entertained the idea of splitting their
states’ electoral votes in proportion to the statewide popular vote, rather than awarding
the entire electoral slate to the winner of the popular vote. The motivations for this idea
are understood to be partisan: the proposal surfaces in states where the partisan preference of the legislature differs from the expected partisan preference of the state’s presidential electorate, such that splitting the electoral vote proportionally would probably
capture more votes for the legislature’s preferred candidate than a winner-take-all system would. See, for example, Reid Wilson, The GOP’s Electoral College Scheme, Natl J
(Dec 17, 2012), online at http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/on-the-trail
/the-gop-s-electoral-college-scheme-20121217 (visited Sept 11, 2013). Today, Maine and
Nebraska already operate on something other than a winner-take-all basis. Accordingly,
it is not the case that the winner-take-all system functions as supreme law. What functions as supreme law is the principle that the electors must be awarded pursuant to the
popular vote. There is more than one way to translate a popular-vote result into a slate
of electors, but no state considers skipping the popular vote and letting the legislature
pick electors directly.
93 It is tempting to explain the behavior in part by reference to a fear of electoral
blowback from a disgusted citizenry. Note, however, that in the example of congressional
elections, that explanation is inapposite. By hypothesis, the majority party will do better
electorally if it manipulates the date than if it doesn’t. Moreover, in both cases the idea
that the voters would punish officeholders who exercised these powers rests on the idea
that the electorate regards the legislature as subject to a higher norm.
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contrary, a plain reading of the text authorizes the very things
that the legislators regard as forbidden.94
5. Supremacy without Article V entrenchment.
In its pure form, the big-C theory maintains that no supreme rule of law can be changed, and no new such rule created,
except through the mechanisms described in Article V. Almost
everyone recognizes, though, that in practice the content of operative constitutional law can be altered through a different
mechanism: persuading a majority of the justices of the Supreme Court. Today, the holdings of controversial cases like Roe
v Wade95 and Citizens United v Federal Election Commission96
operate as supreme law in the United States. Many practitioners seek to change that supreme law. Their efforts are focused
on securing changes in judicial decisionmaking, not on Article V
amendments. If either group succeeds in changing the supreme
law, it will almost surely be through the mechanism of judicial
decisionmaking, not through Article V.
Similarly, the earlier discussion of the two-term limit for
presidents prior to 1940 provides an example of supreme law
that can be changed without Article V. While it lasted, the twoterm limit operated as supreme law for the second of the two
reasons articulated above: it was a norm that people did not attempt to transgress even when it was in their interests to do so,
because the relevant actors considered themselves to be under
the authority of a rule. When the norm collapsed, Article V
played no role.97
6. Supreme law not enforceable through judicial review.
The example of the two-term limit for presidents prior to
1940 also illustrates that supreme law need not be judicially enforced. It seems likely that at no time in history would any court

94 This is not an example of supreme law that contradicts the text. Congress has
chosen the November date for elections, and state legislatures have chosen to let popular
voting allocate presidential electors. The point is simply that the operative supreme law
today does not stop with the proposition that the legislatures choose. It continues to the
proposition that the legislatures are not free to revise some of the choices that have already been made.
95 410 US 113 (1973).
96 558 US 310 (2010).
97 See Part I.A.
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have blocked an attempt to violate the two-term rule, and indeed no court tried to block Roosevelt when he ran a third time.
For another example with Rooseveltian overtones, consider
the rule that the Supreme Court has nine justices. Despite frequent manipulation of the number of justices during the nineteenth century,98 the rule that the number is fixed at nine seems
now to have acquired the status of supreme law. Formally, the
source of that rule is a statute that Congress could change like
any other statute.99 Congress does not regard itself as free to exercise that power.
Consider the enormous gains that a majority party could realize by changing the size of the Court. Suppose that in 2009,
Democratic supermajorities in Congress had expanded the Court
to eleven members, thus giving President Obama two new appointments and the Court a majority of Democratic appointees.
The safety of the Affordable Care Act100 would have been assured, to say nothing of the consequences for abortion, campaign
finance, and who knows what else. But the idea never arose—it’s
simply off the table.
That said, if Congress did decide to change the size of the
Court, it is hard to imagine the courts declaring the change invalid.101 The judiciary lacks a language or a rubric for explaining
why this statute, which Congresses changed for partisan advantage several times before the twentieth century, could not be
changed again today. It seems, therefore, that the rule that the
Supreme Court’s size is fixed at nine operates as supreme law
but not as law that courts would enforce.102
98 See An Act Supplementary to the Act Entitled “An Act to Amend the Judicial
System of the United States” § 1, 5 Stat 176, 176–78 (1837) (increasing the number of
Justices from seven to nine); An Act to Provide Circuit Courts for the Districts of California and Oregon, and for other Purposes § 1, 12 Stat 794, 794–95 (1863) (increasing the
number to ten); An Act to Fix the Number of Judges of the Supreme Court of the United
States, and to Change Certain Judicial Circuits, 14 Stat 209, 209–10 (1866) (reducing
the number to seven); An Act to Amend the Judicial System of the United States § 2, 16
Stat 44, 44–45 (1869) (increasing the number to nine).
99 See 28 USC § 1 (“The Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of a Chief
Justice of the United States and eight associate justices.”).
100 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“Affordable Care Act”), Pub L No
111-148, 124 Stat 119 (2010).
101 See Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds Out the Extraconstitutional Rule
of Recognition at 70–71 (cited in note 64) (reaching the same conclusion).
102 Caution counsels us not to say with absolute certainty that the courts would not
intervene. We cannot know the future, and courts sometimes develop previously unforeseen justifications for novel exercises of judicial review. Indeed, the sense that government has transgressed a boundary that nobody ever believed could possibly be crossed
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7. Article V entrenched without text.
Suppose that the president, exercising his commander-in-chief
power,103 orders military personnel to take Catholic communion
on the eve of battle, believing sincerely that doing so will increase the likelihood of military victory. Under present law, that
order would violate the First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. The idea that the Free Exercise Clause can be
applied against the president, however, is not one that can be
derived by reading the words of the First Amendment. Those
words announce a limitation on the powers of Congress, not the
powers of the president. That said, the idea that the First
Amendment binds the president as well as Congress is a deeply
rooted part of the operative supreme law, and it is hard to imagine its being changed by mere statute.104
Given that the operative supreme law subjects the president
to the dictates of the Free Exercise Clause, it is easy to assume
that freeing the president from those strictures would require an
Article V amendment. If that were so, the rule that the president is bound by the Free Exercise Clause (or the First Amendment more generally) would be an example of a nontextual rule
that can only be changed through the process of Article V. But
on careful consideration, the rule that the First Amendment applies to the president might not be entrenched by Article V as an
operative matter, even though it clearly operates as supreme law.
As discussed earlier, a rule is operatively Article V entrenched if no other avenue of change is as available as change
by the Article V process. To be sure, no non–Article V process
presently seems like a plausible route toward sheltering the
president from the First Amendment. But Article V also seems
like a complete nonstarter toward that end. A proposed constitutional amendment authorizing the president to prohibit the free

often inspires just such doctrinal developments. But this is true only sometimes. Sometimes the real enforcement mechanisms, such as they are, lie elsewhere. In cases like
this one, “elsewhere” includes the internalized attitudes of officeholders, the fear of electoral retribution, and some inarticulate combination of the two. Note too that the fear of
electoral retribution rests on the assumption that the electorate regards the size of the
Court as fixed by a law that the legislature is under an obligation not to transgress.
103 US Const Art II, § 2, cl 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States.”).
104 See Andrew B. Coan, The Irrelevance of Writtenness in Constitutional Interpretation, 158 U Pa L Rev 1025, 1085 (2010) (noting “that the First Amendment bars President Obama from forcibly shutting down Fox News . . . is uncontroversially true, given
the contemporary state of American constitutional law”).
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exercise of religion would never get out of committee. One does
not really report a practical feature of the constitutional system,
therefore, by saying that Article V is what stands in the way of a
change to this constitutional rule. What prevents a change to
this rule is the near-complete absence of support for such a
change. The practical role of Article V as the force holding the
rule in place is reminiscent of the practical role of Lisa Simpson’s tiger-repellant rock: no tigers enter the town of Springfield
when Lisa holds the rock, but only Homer Simpson thinks that
the rock is what secures the outcome.105 For Article V to be the
force entrenching the rule in a practically meaningful way, it
would have to be the case that a movement to change the rule
enjoyed some support and that the Article V process was the
mechanism by which that movement was most likely to succeed—either because success through that route seemed plausible or because success through other routes seemed less plausible still.
Perhaps we could imagine, in a dystopian vein or otherwise,
a political future in which many people sought to give the president more latitude to enforce the law or command the military
without the pesky strictures of individual-rights claims like
those that free exercise doctrine might support.106 Under those
circumstances, identifying Article V as the measure of the rule’s
entrenchment would make sense if the movement for change
had enough support to persuade three-fourths of the state legislatures but not enough support to persuade the Supreme Court
to revise the case law. (Change in the case law would make
amendment unnecessary and demonstrate that the true measure of entrenchment had been the Court’s opposition rather than
Article V.) So: Is it plausible to imagine that such a change
would secure the broad political support necessary to navigate
Article V before securing the support of five justices?
When considering that question, bear in mind that the president seeking the power to require military personnel to take
communion would also be the president who most recently made
105

See The Simpsons: Much Apu about Nothing (Fox Television Broadcast May 5,

1996).
106 Some commentators may think this general scenario is already not so far away,
albeit applied to constitutional rights other than religious free exercise. See, for example,
Noah Feldman, Obama’s Drone Attack on Your Due Process (Bloomberg Feb 8, 2013),
online at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-08/obama-s-drone-attack-on-your-due
-process.html (visited Sept 11, 2013) (describing an administration white paper on the
use of drone strikes as an evisceration of the constitutional guarantee of due process).
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Supreme Court appointments. Bear in mind too that this president would have been chosen by an electorate willing to have a
president who would seek this power. Those facts might color
our sense of how the Court might be disposed toward the question. Consider also that the litigants trying to persuade the
Court to change would insistently point to the text of the First
Amendment, a plain reading of which would vindicate their position. Nontextual rules are easier for courts to enforce when
public consensus regards those rules as obviously correct.107 In
the absence of consensus, or in the face of broad-based opposition, a nontextual rule might be harder for judges to defend. By
the time an Article V amendment becomes plausible, therefore,
it might well not be necessary.
That said, one can also imagine the Court’s holding its
ground, at least for a while, and during that interval Article V
would in fact be the easiest route to changing the constitutional
rule. Suppose that the question of the president’s power to order
troops to take communion came before a Court dominated by
justices appointed fifteen years earlier, by a more civillibertarian president. Perhaps those justices would stand firm
even as public opinion shifted. Finding themselves unable to
persuade the Court, the president’s allies could mount a campaign to amend the Constitution. If public opinion favored the
president’s position broadly enough, the rule might change
through Article V before the Court gave way.
Short of intricate examples like these, it is hard to identify
nontextual rules that one can confidently say are entrenched, in
a practical sense, by the terms of Article V. That difficulty largely reproduces the difficulty with knowing that any rule is Article
V entrenched as an operative matter. Once an idea has enough
support among decisionmakers to navigate the Article V process,
it may also have enough support to be adopted without the need
for Article V because enough decisionmakers (including judges)
come to consider it sensible to understand existing constitutional law as already containing, or at least as already compatible
with, that idea.108 Amendments are more likely to be necessary

107 See Richard Primus, Public Consensus as Constitutional Authority, 78 Geo Wash
L Rev 1207, 1220–21, 1227–28 (2010) (explaining that public consensus can act as an
independent source of authority in constitutional interpretation).
108 See Strauss, 114 Harv L Rev at 1462–63 (cited in note 50). It also sometimes
happens that the decisionmaking class’s collective support for the merits of an idea still
does not yield the view that the Constitution can be read to embody that idea. The
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in instances when the Supreme Court is out of step with the
bulk of the decisionmaking class. Under those circumstances,
Article V offers an easier route to change than judicial revision.
Accordingly, nontextual rules can be Article V entrenched when
the Court is standing up for a nontextual rule that is broadly
unpopular outside the Court. That is not the normal case, but it
can happen from time to time.
8. Article V entrenchment but not supreme law.
Consider two observations described earlier in this Article.
First, there are rules stated in the text of the Constitution that
do not operate as supreme law.109 Second, the text of the Constitution itself is Article V entrenched: we do not alter that text except when Article V amendments are adopted.110 (The meaning
we attribute to that text changes without amendments, but the
text itself does not.)
It follows from those two observations that the rules that
are stated in the text but do not operate as supreme law are, to
the extent that they are rules at all, rules entrenched by the
terms of Article V. Thus, the text states that all criminal trials
in Article III courts must be jury trials. No such rule is followed
in practice. The rule is a rule in some nominal sense, not in an
operative one. It is not the supreme law. But the statement of
that rule that appears in Article III could be changed only by Article V amendment.
Once again, the fact that these verbal formulas cannot be
changed without amendments means considerably less than it
would if those formulas stated operatively supreme rules of law.
But the fact that the words remain even as practice fails to conform is not completely meaningless. The words in the text are
always available as mobilizable resources in constitutional argument. If in the future there were a movement to eliminate
federal bench trials, it would draw support from the language of
Article III—language that would still be there to call upon, in
spite of long practice in apparent derogation of the language,

Twentieth, Twenty-First, and Twenty-Second Amendments—among others—are probably best understood in that vein.
109 See Part I.B.1 (text but not supreme law).
110 See Part I.B.2 (discussing text and formal amendment).
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because the long practice did not eliminate the text. Only Article
V amendment would do that.111
9. Article V entrenched but not enforceable through
judicial review.
A rule falling into this category would be one that legislatures believed themselves unable to change except by Article V
amendment—or perhaps, one that legislatures considered inadvisable to change except by Article V amendment—even though
the courts would not get in the way of other attempted methods
of change.
Consider again the rule that the Supreme Court has nine
members. Formally, the rule is statutory. If Congress were to
amend 28 USC § 1 by increasing the number of justices to eleven, it is hard to imagine the Court striking the new statute
down. That said, Congress seems strongly disinclined to change
the size of the Court even when doing so would be to the manifest advantage of the party in power. That disinclination stems
from legitimacy concerns, derived perhaps partly from the historical meaning of President Franklin Roosevelt’s court-packing
plan and partly from a more abstract sense that the nine-justice
Court should not be manipulated. If some future Congress felt it
necessary to change the size of the Court, therefore, the relevant
decisionmakers might think it safer to do so by Article V
amendment, which seems like an unimpeachable method of
change, than to make the change by statute. That judgment
might be understood as prudential. One might say that Congress legally could increase the size of the Court statutorily if it
wanted to, such that it is misleading to say that such a change
must go through Article V. But on the understanding that a rule
is in practice Article V entrenched only when there is no easier
route to change than Article V amendment, the relevant question here is not whether there is some other method of change
available. It is whether some other method of change is easier
than Article V. And for the purpose of deciding whether Article
V offers the easiest route to change, it makes little difference
how the considerations making other routes more difficult than
Article V are characterized. What matters is that if the change
can be made at all, it will be made under Article V.
111 Or so we reasonably assume. Nothing in American practice to date has suggested
another mechanism.
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This example is speculative. Perhaps a Congress determined to have its way with the Court would act by statute regardless of prudential considerations. Perhaps it would be
backed by a sufficiently supportive public so as to eliminate the
need for prudence—something that seems plausible if an Article
V supermajority were willing to approve the change. Or perhaps
Congress would proceed by statute, reluctantly, precisely because it lacked confidence that three-fourths of the states would
climb on board. More optimistically, perhaps the scenario for enlarging the Court would be one of partisan comity. If both major
parties agreed that the Court needed eleven justices, Congress
might pass a law adding two seats after the president had
agreed to nominate someone chosen by the majority leader of the
Senate—a member of the rival party—to one of the new seats,
thus preventing the expansion from seeming like a partisan manipulation. For all of these reasons, it is possible to imagine circumstances under which the rule setting the size of the Court
could be changed by statute, and in those circumstances the rule
would not be Article V entrenched. But it is also possible to imagine circumstances in which Article V was the best or even the
only plausible route to change, even though a statutory change
would not be invalidated by an exercise of judicial review.
10. Judicial review without text.
States are immune from many federal statutory actions for
damages brought by their own citizens, even though the text of
the Eleventh Amendment speaks only of actions brought by citizens of other states.112 Congress may not commandeer state executive officials.113 States may not purposely impede interstate
commerce.114 The federal executive is bound by the First
Amendment.115 All of these rules are enforced by courts exercising the power of judicial review. None of them is present in the
text of the Constitution.116 Earlier, I illustrated a continuum of
textuality along which constitutional rules can be arranged, and

112

See Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida, 517 US 44, 54 (1996).
See Printz, 521 US at 935.
114 See Hunt v Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 US 333, 348–
54 (1977).
115 See Fox Television Stations, 132 S Ct at 2317–19.
116 See Strauss, The Living Constitution at 32–49 (cited in note 12) (describing the
common-law system of judicial review where cases are decided based on precedent, and
the Constitution plays “at most, a ceremonial role”).
113
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I noted that people might disagree about where along that continuum any particular rule falls.117 But as these examples show,
many well-established judicially enforced rules are not taken
from the text even on a reasonably generous understanding of
what it means for a rule to be textual.
11. Judicial review but not supreme law.
Many rules often thought of as constitutional defaults fall in
this category. Consider dormant commerce doctrine. Courts will
invalidate state laws that purposely burden or discriminate
against interstate commerce, but Congress can override the judiciary and permit a state to burden interstate commerce in a
way that the courts would otherwise forbid.118 The judicial restriction is defeasible by ordinary federal legislation and therefore not supreme law. Similarly, consider the exclusionary rule.
Courts will exclude evidence gathered in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, but not if a legislature creates an adequate alternative remedy.119
12. Judicial review but changeable without Article V
amendment.
Default rules like those just canvassed are on point again
here. The exclusionary rule and the rules of dormant commerce
doctrine can be changed by ordinary legislation. But there is also another important set of rules falling into this category. The
normal and easiest way to change many judicially enforced constitutional rules is to persuade a majority of Supreme Court justices to revise or overrule existing doctrine, either by getting one
or more sitting justices to reverse course or by waiting for the
appointment of different justices. The rule that states may not
unduly burden a woman’s choice to have an abortion and the
rule that Congress may not prevent the use of corporate funds to
pay for election advertisements are both rules that the courts
now enforce through exercises of judicial review. Various actors
now seek to change or eliminate one or both of these rules. They
generally recognize that the path to change does not run
through Article V.
117

See Part I.A.
See, for example, Hillside Dairy Inc v Lyons, 539 US 59, 66 (2003); Maine v Taylor, 477 US 131, 138 (1986).
119 Mapp, 367 US at 651–53.
118
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***
The vision of constitutionality as a status with a single basis
(the text) and three payoffs (supremacy, entrenchment, and judicial review) has some considerable virtues. It captures a great
deal of what is supposed to be valuable about American constitutionalism. It aligns with what most well-informed Americans
would probably say if asked what it means for something to be a
constitutional rule. It helps both to enable and to constrain the
practice of judicial review. But it fails to describe the way the
constitutional system operates in practice, and the failure does
not consist in getting some marginal details wrong. In practice,
many rules that exhibit one or more of these four properties do
not exhibit one or more of the others. Perhaps most crucially,
many rules that do not find their basis in the text are commonly
called constitutional rules and exhibit other characteristics of
constitutional rules, including enforcement through the power of
judicial review.
As noted above, few sophisticated practitioners contend that
this bundled vision accurately captures exactly how constitutional law operates in practice. For some, the bundled big-C vision or something like it is a critique of existing practice: to the
extent that this vision does not map the practice, the argument
runs, the practice is deficient. In my own view, existing practice
makes more sense both practically and normatively than would
a system in which all textual rules and only textual rules were
supreme, entrenched, and judicially enforceable. But a full exploration of this normative controversy would take us far afield.
For present purposes, it is enough to note that it is a mistake to
think of constitutionality in practice as a bundled status, with
text as the basis and the other three characteristics as reliable
payoffs.
Just as a person who is willing to indulge sufficiently motivated readings of text can deny that any valid instances of judicial review proceed without textual warrant, a person willing to
indulge such readings can assert that every rule stated in the
Constitution’s text—properly understood—operates as supreme
law in the American system. People committed to holding together all of the sticks in big-C theory’s constitutional bundle
must accordingly exhibit that indulgence. But as the pragmatist
logicians taught, anything may be held true come what may, so
long as one is prepared to do enough violence to everything
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else.120 If innovative and fanciful readings are the price to be
paid for maintaining the big-C bundle as a description of American practice, it should be clear that textuality will no longer be
doing some of the central work that is claimed to be its virtue:
that is, rendering the content of constitutional law stable and
determinate. And if one thinks that a successful descriptive account of American constitutionality should be less tendentious,
the big-C vision will not do the trick. It pays to consider alternatives.
II. THE SMALL-C BUNDLE(S)
An important collection of constitutional-theory literature is
based on the idea that the written Constitution is not the only
source of constitutional authority.121 In current convention, this
literature is often called “small-c” theory, because it focuses attention on the small-c American “constitution”—that is, on a set
of rules and norms and institutions that guide the process of
government—rather than on the big-C “Constitution,” which is
the 1787 document as amended.122 Small-c theories vary a fair
amount on a variety of points, but they share an insistence on
nontextual constitutionality.
The basic small-c move can be understood as a partial unbundling of the idea of constitutionality. By distinguishing between textuality and constitutional status, small-c theories take
one of the sticks in the big-C bundle—text—and contend that it
can be separated from the others. Crucially, however, small-c
theory tends not to unbundle the idea of constitutionality too
much further. Like the big-C approach, small-c commonly presents constitutionality as a bundle of attributes, some of which
are the bases of constitutionality and some of which are its payoffs.
The idea of a set of payoffs that follow from constitutional
status is crucial to much small-c thinking. After all, one major
goal of much small-c theory is to justify the practice of nontextual judicial review.123 Commonly, the strategy for doing so is to
120 See, for example, Willard Van Orman Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in
Willard Van Orman Quine, From a Logical Point of View: Logico-Philosophical Essays 20
(Harvard 1953).
121 See notes 9 and 11. See also Strauss, The Living Constitution at 34–35 (cited in
note 12).
122 See, for example, Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes at 1 (cited in
note 9); Levinson, Constitutional Faith at 29 (cited in note 6); Young, 117 Yale L J at 414
(cited in note 11).
123 The work of Professors David Strauss and Thomas Grey provides examples. See
generally Strauss, The Living Constitution (cited in note 12). See also Grey, 27 Stan L
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show that something other than text is a legitimate basis of constitutional status. To draw attention to something that usually
is taken for granted, that strategy works if judicial review is a
payoff of constitutional status. If it is, and if something other
than text can underlie constitutional status, nontextual rules
will be entitled to judicial review. But as illustrated earlier with
respect to a simpler model, the idea that constitutionality is a
status with a known set of payoffs is misleading.124 It remains
misleading when applied to the more complex world of small-c
constitutionalism.
A.

Six Sticks

As noted above, small-c theory comes in many different varieties, and different small-c theories focus on different aspects
of constitutionality. Nonetheless, it is possible to capture the
broad range of rules that small-c theorists deem constitutional
by reference to six characteristics. Four of those characteristics
are familiar from the big-C framework: text, supremacy, entrenchment, and judicial enforceability. As I will discuss, these
concepts are sometimes understood in different and less formal
ways within the rubric of small-c theory. To those four characteristics, small-c theory adds two other concepts, each of which
is a potential justification for treating a rule as constitutional.
Drawing on Professor Charles Black, we can call one of those
concepts “structure.”125 Modifying a suggestion by Professor Philip Bobbitt, we can call the other one “ethos.”126 Structure and
ethos supplement or sometimes replace text as qualifying
grounds for constitutional status.
In what follows, I briefly describe what each of these six
concepts means within the rubric of small-c theory. I begin with
three apparent bases of constitutional status: text, structure,
and ethos. I then consider judicial review, which is often the
most important payoff of constitutional status but which is
sometimes also a basis of that status. Finally, I consider

Rev at 706–10 (cited in note 7). There are also important exceptions: sometimes small-c
theory aims to explain why certain rules that have been thought constitutional should in
fact not be enforced through judicial review. See, for example, Ackerman, 1 We the People: Foundations at 131–33 (cited in note 50); Llewellyn, 34 Colum L Rev at 40 (cited in
note 16).
124 See Part I.B.
125 See Black, Structure and Relationship at 9–11, 29–32 (cited in note 32).
126 See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate at 90–106 (cited in note 12).
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supremacy and entrenchment. These are generally understood
as payoffs, albeit payoffs that small-c theory often understands
in relatively fluid ways.
1. Text.
Small-c theory denies that all constitutional rules are textual, but it does not usually deny that text plays an important role
in identifying constitutional rules. On the contrary, most small-c
theorists think of the text of the written Constitution as a sufficient basis for a rule’s constitutionality.127 They simply insist
that there are also other bases that can be sufficient in the absence of text.128
2. Structure.
Many constitutional propositions concern the structure of
government. Indeed, on one understanding of the small-c term
“constitution,” the structure and modes of operation of a government are exactly what that government’s constitution is.129
This idea has many echoes in American small-c theory. Thus,
the constitution in a small-c sense might be “the order and
structure of the body politic,”130 or “the institutional arrangements” that are “the fundamental political institutions of a society.”131 In the same vein, constitutional rules might be those that
tell us how lawmaking is done132 or, more broadly and metaphorically, those that serve as the rules of the game.133
For the pure big-C theorist, the structural propositions with
constitutional status are the ones that can be found in the text

127 See, for example, Levinson, Constitutional Faith at 29 (cited in note 6) (describing the core of the difference between big-C and small-c perspectives as being the exclusivity, vel non, of the text); Black, Structure and Relationship at 30–31 (cited in note 32).
128 See, for example Levinson, Constitutional Faith at 29 (cited in note 6); Strauss,
63 U Chi L Rev at 904 (cited in note 15).
129 See, for example, Young, 117 Yale L J at 415–16 (cited in note 11); Tiedeman,
The Unwritten Constitution at 16 (cited in note 11); Bagehot, The English Constitution at
4–6 (cited in note 10); Aristotle, Constitution of Athens at 83, 113–16 (cited in note 10);
Llewellyn, 34 Colum L Rev at 31 (cited in note 16).
130 Tiedeman, The Unwritten Constitution at 16 (cited in note 11).
131 Strauss, 114 Harv L Rev at 1459–60 (cited in note 50).
132 See William N. Eskridge Jr, America’s Statutory “constitution”, 41 UC Davis L
Rev 1, 12 (2007).
133 See Levinson, 124 Harv L Rev at 700 (cited in note 9).
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of the written Constitution.134 Within small-c theory, however,
structure is often a source of constitutional authority going considerably beyond the text.135 The main thrust of Professor
Charles Black’s canonical lectures on constitutional structure,
for example, was that judges confronting constitutional questions whose substance deals with the structure of government
and the relationship among its institutions should reason directly from those considerations of structure and relationship, rather than considering themselves obligated to reason only from
the words of the Constitution’s text.136
Examples of constitutional rules arising more from structure than from text include those regarding dormant commerce,
state sovereign immunity, legislative delegation, commandeering, and many others, arguably including the norm of judicial
review. To be sure, people can argue about the extent to which
some or all of these norms are grounded in the text, and as always it is possible to find a tremendous amount in the text if one
is willing to entertain sufficiently tendentious textual interpretations. But constitutional rules like the ones listed above are
more straightforwardly explained in structural terms, such that
accepting the legitimacy of structural, nontextual constitutional
authority exempts one from having to endorse awkward textual
readings. Whether for that reason or others, the idea that structure can be a valid nontextual source of constitutional rules enjoys widespread if quiet acceptance among leading American
practitioners. Supreme Court justices and even Supreme Court
majorities sometimes forthrightly acknowledge that structure
rather than text underlies a given constitutional rule.137
134 See, for example, John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in
Constitutional Interpretation, 122 Harv L Rev 2003, 2039–40 (2009) (arguing against the
practice of recognizing constitutional structure apart from constitutional text).
135 See, for example, Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Legitimacy of Freestanding Federalism, 122 Harv L Rev F 98, 103–05 (2009).
136 Black, Structure and Relationship at 12–13, 22–23 (cited in note 32). To be sure,
Black often seemed to have an expansive conception of structure, as well as a heightened
sense of how clearly that structure—or a particular view of that structure—would resolve a given question.
137 See, for example, Central Virginia Community College v Katz, 546 US 356, 375
(2006) (“[W]e have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it
says, but for the presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms.”)
(brackets in original), quoting Blatchford v Native Village of Noatak, 501 US 775, 779
(1991); Printz v United States, 521 US 898, 905 (1997) (Scalia) (“Because there is no constitutional text speaking to this precise question, the answer to the CLEOs’ challenge
must be sought in historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court.”). To be sure, justices also sometimes deny
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To ground a constitutional rule in considerations of structure is to justify it on a substantive basis rather than a formal
one. A pure structural argument does not claim that some rule
qualifies for constitutional status because it was enacted by an
authoritative process or because it appears in an authoritative
list of constitutional rules. Instead, the claim that a rule qualifies on structural grounds for constitutional status is a judgment
that some set of facts about the institutions of government justifies treating that rule in a certain way—for example, as supreme
law, or as entrenched against revision, or as enforceable through
the power of judicial review.138 Thus, the structural argument for
dormant commerce doctrine relies on a judgment about the appropriate roles of state governments, and the structural argument for judicial review relies on a judgment about the appropriate role of courts vis-à-vis other institutions in light of the
competences and predictable pathologies of each.139
On the big-C conception, the desirability of removing such
substantive judgments from constitutional law is precisely why
constitutional status should follow only from the formal criterion
of adoption as part of the Constitution’s text. After all, the substantive judgments that underlie structural claims are things
about which people disagree. If those judgments are permitted
to determine what counts as a constitutional rule, the argument
runs, the judiciary will exercise judicial review on the basis of
subjective and contestable judgments. That argument is surely
true, so a sophisticated small-c theorist should not contest the
charge that recognizing structure as a source of constitutionality
guarantees conflict about the content of constitutional law. Instead, the small-c theorist might point out that such conflicts

the validity of putative structural rules on the grounds that the text does not support
them. See, for example, Department of Revenue of Kentucky v Davis, 553 US 328, 361
(2008) (Thomas concurring) (rejecting dormant commerce doctrine as having “no basis in
the Constitution”).
138 An argument in favor of recognizing some structural principle as a constitutional
rule might have a formal basis if the argument were essentially originalist. That is, one
might argue that the principle in question is an authoritative constitutional rule because
the Founders intended, expected, or understood it to be so, thus implicitly enacting it
when they ratified the Constitution. In such an argument, the fact that the rule in question is structural is incidental to its status as a constitutional rule. What qualifies the
rule as constitutional is the authority of an original understanding. The argument about
the Eleventh Amendment put forth in Katz and Blatchford is officially of this variety.
See note 137.
139 See, for example, Richard H. Fallon Jr, The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial
Review, 121 Harv L Rev 1693, 1699–1700 (2008) (offering such an argument).
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reflect differences of judgment that are inevitable in identifying
constitutional rules. Indeed, such differences of judgment occur
even when the constitutional rules in question are thought to be
grounded in the text.140
The idea that structure underlies the constitutional status
of many constitutional rules is not intended to make constitutional law determinate by eliminating those differences in judgment. Whether or not we recognize structure as one of the bases
for constitutionality, American legal discourse will feature a
great deal of conflict about which rules are entitled to constitutional status. The value of recognizing structure as one basis of
constitutionality lies in clarifying the content of that struggle.
When we argue about whether something is a constitutional
rule, one of the things that often drives the argument is a difference in judgments about structure.
3. Ethos.
Small-c theories often accord constitutional status to rules
that reflect, or that are asserted to reflect, the deep normative
commitments that define Americans as a political community.
This rubric is variously described in terms of fundamental principles,141 basic national ideals,142 tradition,143 and in other ways
as well. Adapting a term from Professor Bobbitt, I will use the
label “ethos” to name this ground of constitutionality.144

140 Professor Charles Black put the point in the following unsubtle way: “I do not
think I am suggesting that precision be supplanted by wide-open speculation. The precision of textual explication is nothing but specious in the areas that matter.” Black, Structure and Relationship at 29 (cited in note 32). One need not condemn all textual explication as specious in order to recognize the strength of the basic point that practitioners
confronting structural issues are quite capable of disagreeing even where there are texts
on point.
141 See, for example, Tribe, The Invisible Constitution at 128 (cited in note 86).
142 See, for example, Grey, 27 Stan L Rev at 706 (cited in note 7).
143 See, for example, Strauss, 63 U Chi L Rev at 879, 891–94 (cited in note 15) (describing the idea of “rational traditionalism”).
144 See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate at 93–119 (cited in note 12). My use of the term
is indebted to, but broader than, Professor Bobbitt’s. Professor Bobbitt uses “ethos” not
just to name the generic idea that a conception of the values of the American polity can
give rise to constitutional rules but to identify one particular value that he sees as generating such rules: limited government. See, for example, id at 230. For small-c theorists
other than Professor Bobbitt, however, principles other than limited government may be
as important to the American constitutional ethos as limited government is in Professor
Bobbitt’s view. In my attempt to capture the conception of small-c constitutionalism
broadly, therefore, I use the idea of ethos generically, to capture constitutional rules that
follow from any prevailing ideas about who we are as a people and what we therefore
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Many constitutional rules protecting individual rights are
matters of ethos, but not every “ethical” constitutional principle
is best characterized as a matter of individual rights. Constitutional rules arising from ethos, as I am using the term, are any
constitutional rules grounded by a deeply held set of judgments
about the values of the American polity. There is a great deal of
controversy over the content of those values, and that conflict
plays out in constitutional discourse. When we argue about
whether a public university may use race-based affirmative action in its admissions policy, or whether a state may execute a
criminal who committed his crimes as a child, we are arguing
about the content of those values that comprise the American
ethos. The winning side of such arguments has its views adopted—in whole or in part, depending on the extent of the victory—
into prevailing constitutional law.
On a strict big-C view, of course, the only values entitled to
constitutional status are the ones written into the text of the
Constitution. On a small-c view, American constitutional law
validly includes many rules whose source lies in the fact of the
values themselves, irrespective of whether those values are reflected in the text of the Constitution. Many constitutional
norms that reflect deep American values are indeed stated or at
least gestured at in the Constitution’s text, and not just by coincidence. But the small-c perspective points out that the content
of constitutional law often tracks the content of the values more
closely than it tracks the content of the text. For example, the
First Amendment gives freedom of speech a place in the constitutional text, but the constitutional law of free speech goes far
beyond the text of the First Amendment. Constitutional protection of free speech runs against all government actors, even
though the First Amendment’s guarantee is textually addressed
only to Congress.145 Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment gives
equality a place in the text, but the constitutional law of equal
protection runs against the federal government even though the
Fourteenth Amendment is textually addressed only to states.146
Accordingly, the text reasonably authorizes the big-C theorist to
identify free speech and equal protection as constitutional
would or would not do through our political institutions, rather than only those arising
from the specific conception of ethos that Professor Bobbitt proposes.
145 See, for example, Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444, 447–49 (1969) (applying free
speech protection against a state government).
146 See, for example, Adarand Constructors, Inc v Pena, 515 US 200, 227 (1995).
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values, but if he wants to justify these mainstream applications
of those principles, he must resort to creative textual readings.
In contrast, small-c theorists can regard the constitutional values of equality and free speech as rooted at least partly in ethos
rather than in text. The fact that the textual mentions of those
values have narrower scope than operative constitutional law
does not create any important problems from this perspective,
because the text is assumed to be only one of multiple sources
for the values. Constitutional law properly tracks the union of
all of the sources rather than only one.
Constitutional rules arising from ethos tend to be tied to
narratives of American history, usually heroic ones. To return to
the previous examples, it is no accident that free speech doctrine
became applicable to states, and equal protection doctrine to the
federal government, during the decades of national struggle
against Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. A sense of the
meaning of America took shape in light of that historical chapter, and that sense of the national ethos drove changes in constitutional law.147 Similarly, the recent conflict over whether the
Second Amendment confers an individual right of gun ownership played out in large part as a struggle about the character of
the society from which modern America descends.148 That said, a
tie to a grand national narrative is not always a feature of constitutional rules grounded in ethos. Lived experience can also do
the trick. When the Supreme Court in Dickerson v United
States149 rejected Congress’s attempt to limit the requirement of
reading Miranda150 warnings, it did so in part because the warnings had become embedded in the national culture.151 Americans
engaged in a highly visible practice for more than a generation,
and that practice came to shape how decisionmakers understood
who we are as a people.
The category of ethos has fuzzy boundaries, if it has boundaries at all. That fuzziness is not a defect. It is a reflection of the
147

See Primus, The American Language of Rights at 177–233 (cited in note 80).
See, for example, Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 Harv L Rev 191, 194–95 (2008).
149 530 US 428 (2000).
150 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).
151 See Dickerson v United States (No. 99-5525) - Opinion Announcement at 00:24–
00:33 (Oyez Project 2013), online at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1990-1999/1999/1999
_99_5525/opinion (visited Sept 11, 2013) (Chief Justice Rehnquist explaining, when announcing Dickerson, that the Miranda warnings “have echoed through police stations
and on television screens in the thirty-four years since we decided the case of Miranda
versus Arizona”).
148
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social fact that the set of ideas people recognize as stating constitutional principles on ethical grounds is not sharply delimited. The idea of ethos, like the idea of structure, is not a criterion for deciding whether a given claim about constitutional law
should be recognized as valid. It is a generalization intended to
capture a set of norms that many people do in practice deem
constitutional.
4. Judicial review.
The judicial enforceability of constitutional rules plays a
critical but slippery role in much small-c thinking. As on the bigC conception, small-c constitutionalism regards many but not all
constitutional rules as enforceable by courts exercising the power of judicial review. Indeed, whether it is appropriate to exercise judicial review on the basis of rules not written in the text of
the constitution is often the central contested question between
big-C and small-c theorists. In such cases, justifying judicial review that is not based on text is an intended payoff of small-c
theory.
In some important strains of small-c theory, however, judicial enforceability is not only a payoff of constitutional status. It
is also a source of that status. On Professor David Strauss’s
model of common-law constitutionalism, for example, the process by which judges develop reasoned understandings over time
is itself a source of constitutional authority.152 Professor Philip
Bobbitt’s treatment of doctrinal argument as a modality of constitutional reasoning similarly treats the discourse of judges
over time as a source of constitutional status.153
Like a big-C theorist, a small-c theorist might point to concededly legitimate exercises of judicial review as evidence that
the rule being enforced is a constitutional rule. After all, the argument would run, judicial review can only legitimately be exercised on the basis of constitutional rules. But when a big-C theorist makes that inference, he implicitly (or explicitly) takes the
legitimacy of the judicial enforcement in question as resting ultimately on the authority of the constitutional text. For Professor Bobbitt, and perhaps also for Professor Strauss, it may be
unnecessary to posit an ultimate source of constitutionality prior
to judicial behavior. Rather than taking judicial review as a
152
153

Strauss, 63 U Chi L Rev at 904–05 (cited in note 15).
See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate at 39–58 (cited in note 12).
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practice in need of external justification, these versions of smallc constitutionalism regard judicial review as an accepted feature
of the constitutional system.154 This does not mean, of course,
that anything judges might choose to do would be a legitimate
enforcement of a constitutional rule. But it does mean that judges can take prior judicial discussions of constitutionality as legitimate sources for judicial review today, particularly if those prior discussions have been widely accepted, and that judges today
may continue the reasoned elaboration of the rules and principles that prior judges have deemed constitutional.155 Seen in this
light, judicial review is both a payoff and a source of constitutional status.
5. Supremacy.
Like big-C theory, small-c theory commonly regards constitutional rules as supreme over nonconstitutional rules. For a
long time, some small-c theorists commenting on instances
where prevailing practice contradicts the written Constitution
have accordingly concluded that the prevailing practice in question reflects a constitutional rule and the rule written in the
Constitution is not a constitutional rule. After all, the rule reflected in prevailing practice is the one that is operatively
supreme.156
Some small-c theorists have brought important nuances to
the supremacy idea. For example, constitutional supremacy
might be dimensional rather than dichotomous, with different
kinds of constitutional rules enjoying different levels of supremacy. Consider the role that Professors William Eskridge and
John Ferejohn imagine for a category of laws called “superstatutes.”157 In their view, these statutes are a core component of
the small-c constitution, and they are supreme over other forms

154 See, for example, id at 237–38 (describing judicial review as a practice that is
fundamental to the system, rather than one in need of external justification).
155 See Strauss, 63 U Chi L Rev at 887, 898 (cited in note 15).
156 See, for example, Tiedeman, The Unwritten Constitution at 89–90 (cited in note
11); Seidman, 32 Cardozo L Rev at 1154 (cited in note 70). These instances contrast with
a different and perhaps more common attitude among people who recognize nontextual
bases for constitutional law, which is to regard all of the text as supreme law, albeit
without being exhaustive of the supreme law. See Levinson, Constitutional Faith at 29
(cited in note 6).
157 William N. Eskridge Jr and John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 Duke L J 1215,
1216 (2001).
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of law but inferior to the text of the Constitution itself.158 Professor Keith Whittington’s idea of the “constitutional construction”
also names a kind of nontextual constitutional rule that is superior to nonconstitutional law but inferior to law derived from the
Constitution’s text.159 On these conceptions, it remains the case
that supremacy over nonconstitutional law is a characteristic of
constitutional rules, and there are then further considerations
that sort out relationships of supremacy within the constitutional realm.
6. Entrenchment.
Entrenchment plays a central role in most small-c conceptions of constitutionality. Indeed, for some small-c theorists, entrenchment is close to being the essential constitutional trait.160
But entrenchment on the small-c approach need not be entrenchment according to the terms of Article V.161 Indeed, it has
become common for small-c theorists to assert that Article V’s
vision of entrenchment is marginal to American constitutional
law in practice, because formal amendment is rarely the real
mechanism of constitutional change.162
What, then, do small-c theorists mean when speaking of
constitutional entrenchment? The answers are varied and sometimes slippery. Depending on the theory, the description of a
rule as entrenched might mean that people generally expect the
rule to persist for a long time,163 that people take for granted
that the rule is settled and do not think pragmatically about its

158 See Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes at 8, 293 (cited in note 9);
Eskridge and Ferejohn, 50 Duke L J at 1217 (cited note 157).
159 Whittington, Constitutional Construction at 2 (cited in note 12).
160 See, for example, Seidman, 32 Cardozo L Rev at 1147–48 (cited in note 70);
Llewellyn, 34 Colum L Rev at 22 (cited in note 16).
161 Simultaneously asserting that entrenchment is key to constitutionality and that
Article V is not the exclusive form of constitutional entrenchment has been a feature of
small-c theory for a very long time. See, for example, Llewellyn, 34 Colum L Rev at 21–
22 (cited in note 16) (describing “highly probable permanence” as an “essential criterion”
of constitutionality and, on the previous page, describing the idea that Article V amendment is the chief process of constitutional change as “superstitions”).
162 See, for example, Strauss, 114 Harv L Rev at 1459 (cited in note 50); Ackerman,
120 Harv L Rev at 1767 (cited in note 32) (arguing that the normal mode of constitutional change is presidential leadership and that the Reconstruction Amendments were necessary only because of the unusual circumstance that an accidental President—Andrew
Johnson—opposed the dominant party’s program of reform).
163 See, for example, Munro, The Makers of the Unwritten Constitution at 8–9 (cited
in note 48).
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costs and benefits,164 that even the rule’s former opponents now
regard it as beyond partisan debate,165 or that a popular consensus holds that the rule is a good one.166 These formulations are
all distinct. For any combination of them, we could identify examples of rules that would be entrenched on one conception but
not on others. That said, the formulations are also largely overlapping as applied to actual rules, such that many rules could be
described as entrenched for more than one of these reasons.
Entrenchment conceived in any of these ways is a matter of
degree rather than a binary condition. Along any of these dimensions, a rule can be more or less entrenched. According to
some small-c theorists, the degree of a rule’s entrenchment mirrors the degree of its constitutionality. Very entrenched rules
are very constitutional, and rules that are only somewhat entrenched are less so.167 And a complete picture of entrenchment
would have to account for the fact that a given rule might enjoy
different degrees of entrenchment for several different kinds of
entrenchment. One rule might be very entrenched in the sense
that people take its settlement for granted but less entrenched
in the sense of being supported on its merits by popular consensus; another rule might exhibit the opposite combination. To
take the measure of a rule’s entrenchment, therefore, it is necessary to ask not just “How much?” but “How much of each kind?”
If entrenchment is conceived in these terms, then there is no
formal process that can be guaranteed to entrench a rule.
Whether a rule is entrenched is partly a matter of attitudes and
partly a matter of the practical obstacles to doing without the
rule. To be sure, one can identify processes that might bring
about the attitudes and practical circumstances that would
make a rule entrenched. If the rule is endorsed by respected persons and institutions, or if persuasive arguments are made for
it, or if the right people come to regard it as in their interests,
then enough of the necessary people may develop the requisite
attitudes for that rule to become entrenched. Similarly, the
world might be structured so as to make repudiation of a rule extremely costly, whether deliberately or otherwise. Entrenchment

164

See, for example, Llewellyn, 34 Colum L Rev at 26–27 (cited in note 16).
See Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes at 114 (cited in note 9);
Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformations at 10–11 (cited in note 86).
166 See Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes at 13 (cited in note 9).
167 See, for example, Seidman, 32 Cardozo L Rev at 1148 (cited in note 70); Llewellyn, 34 Colum L Rev at 30 (cited in note 16).
165
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might in some cases be fostered simply by a rule’s longevity, if
people come to take the rule for granted or to order their affairs
around it, thus becoming invested in its continuance.168 But no
set of steps can be guaranteed to entrench a rule to any particular degree, because there is no formal process that can be guaranteed either to bring about a particular set of attitudes in the
population or to forestall decisionmakers’ willingness to incur
the practical costs of change.
B.

Several Bundles

No small-c theory holds that every constitutional proposition exhibits all six aspects of constitutionality described above.
The essential move of small-c theory, after all, is the denial that
one of those aspects—textuality—is necessary for a rule to enjoy
constitutional status. Nor do small-c theories characteristically
insist that all constitutional rules display all of the other features associated with constitutionality. But small-c theories
have assembled bundles of their own from within the universe of
constitutional characteristics. Classic small-c writers like Professors Charles Black, Thomas Grey, and Philip Bobbitt conceived of constitutionality as a status that bundles structure or
ethos (or both) with judicial review.169 On their view, rules with
appropriate structural or ethical content are constitutional
rules, and as constitutional rules they are entitled to judicial enforcement. More recently, some of the most influential small-c
literature has developed a conception of nontextual constitutionality that bundles structure and ethos with supremacy and
entrenchment but pointedly not with judicial review. Prominent
theorists working in this vein include Professors William
Eskridge, John Ferejohn, and Keith Whittington.170
Each of those conceptions has offered a solution to a prominent problem. Classic small-c writers strove to make it possible
to speak openly about nontextual judicial review as a legitimate
aspect of constitutional decisionmaking, rather than leaving it

168

See Levinson, 124 Harv L Rev at 707 (cited in note 9).
See Black, Structure and Relationship at 11 (cited in note 32) (structure); Grey,
27 Stan L Rev at 706 (cited in note 7) (ethos); Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate at 93–96 (cited
in note 12) (both).
170 See Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review 5–7, 11–13, 79 (Kansas 1999); Eskridge and Ferejohn, A
Republic of Statutes at 1–2, 7–8 (cited in note 9).
169
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in the shadows as a practice that dare not speak its name.171 As
we all know, that effort was not wholly successful. The legitimacy of nontextual judicial review remains hotly contested, and
even many people who are not hard-line textualists are inclined
to minimize its role. In part, serious discomfort with nontextual
judicial review persists because of anxiety that nontextual judicial review means license for judges to impose their subjective
views on the polity, rather than remaining faithful to an objective authority worthy of being called law.172 The more recent
wave of small-c writing offers to solve that problem. By retaining the idea that constitutional rules can arise from sources other than the text but reserving judicial review for constitutional
rules that are textual, these theorists make it possible to think
about important facets of structure and ethos and supremacy
and entrenchment without stoking controversy over nontextual
judicial review.
Unfortunately, each of these efforts exhibits the problems
with constitutional bundling. In different ways, each obscures
the complexity of constitutional law by imagining constitutionality as a status with known payoffs that follow from known bases.
Professors Black, Grey, and Bobbitt wrote as if their bases for
constitutional status made rules fit for judicial review, when in
fact they do so only sometimes. Professors Eskridge, Ferejohn,
and Whittington purport to sort the bases of constitutionality into those that yield judicial review and those that do not, but in
practice the different elements of constitutionality often combine
in ways that their models cannot accommodate. Albeit with different sticks from those used in the simple big-C bundle, these
small-c theorists repeat the mistake of imagining constitutionality as a consistently bundled status.
1. Classic bundles: justifying judicial review.
The tendency to treat constitutionality as a status with a
bundled set of criteria and payoffs is a prominent feature of
classic small-c writing. In particular, much of that literature
presents the nontextual bases of constitutional status as
171 See, for example, Black, Structure and Relationship at 31 (cited in note 32) (suggesting that structural interpretation “be brought more clearly into the conscious field”);
Grey, 27 Stan L Rev at 706 (cited in note 7) (lamenting the tendency of judges to hide
their nontextual reasoning).
172 See Ely, Democracy and Distrust at 43–72 (cited in note 7) (criticizing nontexual
judicial review).
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foundations for the payoff of judicial review.173 The basic argument of Professor Charles Black’s Structure and Relationship in
Constitutional Law, for example, is that the source of many important constitutional rules is structural rather than textual
and that those rules, being constitutional rules, should be considered supreme, entrenched, and valid subjects for enforcement
through the exercise of judicial review.174 Professor Black took
judicial review to be a payoff of constitutional status, so his conclusion that a certain set of nontextual rules can be enforced
through judicial review follows if he can establish structure as a
source of that status. Professor Thomas Grey’s Do We Have an
Unwritten Constitution? has a parallel shape, but with ethos rather than structure as the criterion for constitutionality. Professor Grey argued that American law has long regarded a set of
“basic national ideals of individual liberty and fair treatment” as
protected by unwritten constitutional rules that it is the judiciary’s role to enforce.175 Professor Philip Bobbitt’s Constitutional
Fate follows both of these leads, identifying both structure and
ethos as sources of constitutional authority.176 And as Professor
Bobbitt explains, the point of identifying sources of constitutional authority—at least in Constitutional Fate—is to understand
the practice of judicial review.177
Professors Black, Grey, and Bobbitt wrote during a fifteenyear period that followed the heyday of the Warren Court and
that included the decision in Roe v Wade.178 The practice of nontextual judicial review came under trenchant attack in those
years,179 and it should not be surprising that leading small-c

173 To be sure, some leading small-c thinkers have had the opposite project: Professors Karl Llewellyn and Bruce Ackerman have both advanced theories of constitutionality arguing for the disentrenchment of norms that would otherwise be considered formally entrenched and eligible for judicial protection. Professor Llewellyn’s The Constitution
as an Institution, published in 1934, was an argument for letting the elected branches
make far-reaching changes in federal governance without judicial interference, and Professor Ackerman’s We the People is in large part a defense of the judges’ having gotten
out of the way of that reform program. See Llewellyn, 34 Colum L Rev at 21–23 (cited in
note 16); Ackerman, 2 We the People: Transformations at 99–119 (cited in note 86).
174 See Black, Structure and Relationship at 11, 15 (cited in note 32).
175 See Grey, 27 Stan L Rev at 706 (cited in note 7).
176 See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate at 74–122 (cited in note 12).
177 See id at 3, 233.
178 Roe, 410 US at 152–54.
179 See, for example, Raoul Berger, Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of
the Fourteenth Amendment 1–8 (Harvard 1977); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind L J 1, 1 (1971). See also Ely, Democracy and
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thinkers set about arguing that constitutional law properly understood provided justifications for judicial review in defense of
rules beyond those written in the text. That said, the practice of
understanding constitutionality as a bundled status within
which nontextual criteria justify the payoff of judicial review
was a common feature of small-c writing long before the Warren
Court. To cite just one example, Professor Christopher
Tiedeman’s The Unwritten Constitution of the United States appeared in 1890, focused on structure as the source of constitutionality, and argued that one of the most important features of
the idea that some rules have constitutional status is its ability
to legitimize the exercise of judicial review, including judicial
review on behalf of individual rights not written into the
document.180
Assuming that prevailing practice is a decent guide to legitimate behavior, theorists like these were right to insist that
many structural and ethical rules are appropriate subjects of judicial review, whether or not those rules can be found in the
text. As discussed above, settled constitutional law is shot
through with nontextual rules.181 Again, one can minimize or
even deny that fact if one is willing to indulge sufficiently creative readings of text, but that strategy sacrifices most of what is
supposed to make textualism valuable.
It is misleading, though, to explain nontextual judicial review by saying that structural and ethical propositions are entitled to judicial enforcement because they are constitutional. If
that explanation seems sensible, it is because we are accustomed
to assuming that constitutional rules, as such, are fit for judicial
review. And we are so accustomed. But that may be largely because the vision of big-C constitutionalism continues to be influential, even for people who consciously reject the notion that all
constitutional rules are in the text. The big-C vision holds that
the text is the valid basis for judicial review. If all constitutional
rules are textual, it follows easily that constitutional rules are
per se valid subjects of judicial review. But if the category of
“constitutional rules” includes nontextual rules rooted in structure
Distrust at 43–72 (cited in note 7) (recognizing the limits of pure textualism but criticizing the idea that judicial review should enforce nontextual fundamental values).
180 See Tiedeman, The Unwritten Constitution at 42–44, 47–49, 67–82, 163 (cited in
note 11). Professor Tiedeman knew nothing of the Warren Court, of course. For him, a
leading example of sound judicial review without textual warrant was the Court’s decision in Slaughter-House. See id at 102–09.
181 See Part I.A.
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or ethos, a rule’s constitutionality will indicate its eligibility for
judicial review only if we have separately shown that rules rooted in structure or ethos are valid subjects of judicial review.
Without that showing, justifying those payoffs on the ground
that structural or ethical content makes a rule “constitutional”
might be an analytic error or a rhetorical trick.
To be clear, the missing showing about why a rule’s structural or ethical content warrants judicial review need not—
indeed, should not—be an explanation for why all structural and
ethical rules are judicially enforceable. Textual rules are not all
judicially enforceable, and there is little reason to think that
other kinds of constitutional rules would uniformly be. As a matter of prevailing practice, only some structural propositions, and
only some ethical ones, are treated as judicially enforceable.
Dormant commerce doctrine is built on structural propositions,
but the rule setting the size of the House of Representatives is
also a structural rule, and indeed a rule that prominent small-c
theorists have identified as constitutional in their sense,182 but
no court would invalidate a statute doubling the size of the
House.
There could of course be sound reasons for having judges enforce some structural rules but not others. The federal judiciary
might be well positioned to strike down protectionist state legislation but have no good basis for deciding whether the House of
Representatives should have 435 members or 500. Similarly,
unelected judges might be better than legislatures at applying
ethical principles of individual liberty to concrete situations
where majority sentiment or the general welfare seem to point
in the other direction, even if legislatures are at least as well positioned as courts to reflect and formulate national values in the
long run. Without attempting to go deeply into how these principles might apply, one can say that it makes sense to allocate
decisionmaking on the basis of institutional-competence considerations like these.183
Whether or not institutional competence is the chosen
framework, the small-c constitutionalist needs some criteria for
determining which propositions, out of the universe of structural
182

See, for example, Whittington, Constitutional Construction at 12 (cited in note

12).
183 That people will disagree about how to apply such institutional-competence criteria does not differentiate those criteria from any other criteria that could plausibly be
used instead.
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and ethical norms, are the ones that can be enforced by judicial
review. And it would make little sense to say that the judicially
enforceable rules are the constitutional ones. That statement
might simply collapse constitutionality into fitness for judicial
review, such that characterization of a rule as constitutional
would announce rather than explain its judicial enforceability.
Or else it would pretend to give a reason while actually begging
the question, and it would do so by trading on the notion of constitutionality as a bundle of characteristics that travel together,
one of which is judicial review. That notion cannot withstand
close scrutiny. The characteristics we associate with constitutionality often travel separately, and reasons are needed to explain why particular rules exhibiting some of those characteristics should be treated as if they also had others.
2. Split bundles: ducking judicial review.
The tendency to theorize constitutionality as a bundle of criteria and payoffs has also appeared in the work of small-c scholars with a very different set of attitudes toward judicial review.
As is widely understood, the idea of nontextual constitutional
rules commonly provokes the anxiety that courts will have no
sound way of knowing which rules they are authorized to enforce.184 That anxiety often pushes people back to big-C constitutionalism, or at least to something near it.185 Recently, however,
a number of leading theorists have found another alternative.
They recognize a realm of nontextual constitutional law but reserve judicial review for constitutional rules that are textual. In
other words, they take the set of constitutional traits and assemble them into not one bundle but two.
Consider a framework developed by Professor Keith Whittington. In a body of writing put forth over a period of several
years, Professor Whittington distinguished constitutional rules
rooted in the text, which he called “interpretations,” from nontextual constitutional rules, which he called “constructions.”186
184

See text accompanying note 179.
Professor Bobbitt’s narrative of the rising influence of Justice Hugo Black as a
response to the apparent nontextual judging of the midcentury Court offers an exemplary illustration. In Professor Bobbitt’s telling, it was precisely the worry that the midcentury Court lacked firm and objective bases for its exercises of judicial review that make
Justice Black’s endorsement of simple textualism seem so compelling. See Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate at 29–33 (cited in note 12).
186 See, for example, Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation at 5–7, 11–13, 79
(cited in note 170).
185
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Constitutional constructions, Professor Whittington explained,
set important ground rules for legal and political behavior on
matters of structure and ethos in areas where the constitutional
text is silent or ambiguous. For example, Professor Whittington
says that the rule whereby the Supreme Court has nine justices
is a constitutional construction, as is the freezing of the number
of members of House of Representatives at 435 and the rule that
these Representatives shall be elected from single-member districts.187 In ways like these, Professor Whittington says, a smallc constitution consequentially shapes American government.
But in Professor Whittington’s view, the constructions that comprise the small-c constitution are a second-class form of constitutional law. They may not conflict with the text of the big-C Constitution. They validly operate only in areas that the big-C text
leaves open. And perhaps most importantly, judges may exercise
judicial review only on the basis of big-C constitutional text.188
This framework groups the various attributes of constitutionality into two separate bundles. One bundle includes text,
supremacy, Article V entrenchment, and judicial review. That is
the realm of what Professor Whittington calls “constitutional interpretation.” The other bundle, which is “constitutional construction,” includes structure, ethos, and a de facto form of entrenchment, by which is meant that constitutional constructions
have greater staying power than ordinary laws do. (To be clear,
“interpretations” as well as “constructions” regularly concern
structure and ethos. But what makes constitutional interpretations interpretations is their textuality.) There is nuance here,
and the rubric is deservedly influential. Note, however, that this
theory of nontextual constitutionalism has no place for nontextual judicial review, indeed emphatically not. By segregating the
judicial-review aspect of constitutionality from the nontextual
bases of constitutionality, Professor Whittington creates a system that acknowledges the value of thinking about nontextual
propositions as “constitutional” but maintains big-C ideas about
the relationship between text and judicial review.
Small-c constitutionalism has a similar limit in the writings
of Professors William Eskridge and John Ferejohn. In their
view, many federal statutes enjoy constitutional status in a
small-c sense. Examples include the Administrative Procedure

187
188

See Whittington, Constitutional Construction at 12 (cited in note 12).
See Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation at 6 (cited in note 170).
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Act,189 the Voting Rights Act,190 and the Clean Air191 and Clean
Water Acts.192 Such statutes structure lawmaking and other
governmental processes, and they reflect deeply and widely held
normative views, and they are relatively entrenched against
change—not formally entrenched, but practically entrenched,
because the norms they embody enjoy wide and deep support.193
The idea of laws that are statutory in form but constitutional in essence is a deeply small-c idea, and Professors Eskridge
and Ferejohn present it forthrightly as such. They contend, and
reasonably, that a small-c constitutional framework is far better
than the big-C framework for understanding the important
workings of modern American government.194 Professors
Eskridge and Ferejohn are careful to say, though, that small-c
constitutional statutes cannot override the big-C constitutional
text.195 And though the norms that constitutional statutes embody might color judicial interpretations of the big-C Constitution, the courts may not exercise the power of judicial review on
the basis of a statute—not even a constitutional statute.196
Like Professor Whittington, Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn deflate the worry that nontextual constitutionalism invites
overly subjective exercises of judicial review by grouping the
properties of constitutionality into two different bundles. Textual propositions are formally supreme, formally entrenched, and
legitimate bases for judicial review. Nontextual constitutional
propositions enjoy whatever level of practical entrenchment
arises from the consensus that supports them. We can think of
this approach as a hybrid of big-C and small-c theories. Yes,
these theorists say, we have a small-c constitution, and that fact
is important in the operation of American government. But the

189 Pub L No 79-404, ch 324, 60 Stat 237 (1946), codified as amended in various sections of Title 5. See also Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes at 10–11 (cited in
note 9).
190 Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437 (1965), codified as amended at 42 USC § 1971 et
seq. See also Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes at 88–89 (cited in note 9).
191 Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub L No 88-206, 77 Stat 392, codified at 42 USC § 7401
et seq. See also Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes at 256 (cited in note 9).
192 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub L No 92-500, 86
Stat 816, codified at 33 USC § 1251 et seq. See Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of
Statutes at 256 (cited in note 9).
193 See Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes at 13 (cited in note 9).
194 See, for example, Eskridge, 41 UC Davis L Rev at 5–6 (cited in note 132).
195 See, for example, Eskridge and Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes at 1, 8 (cited in
note 9).
196 See id.
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written Constitution still has the status that big-C theory has
traditionally claimed.
This hybrid approach is in some ways a clever attempt to
sidestep central problems in both big-C and small-c theory, rather than a solution to those problems. Professors Eskridge,
Ferejohn, and Whittington acknowledge and develop the small-c
idea that American law has a category of rules on structural and
ethical subjects that seem to be regarded as more powerful or
more fundamental than other, ordinary rules, albeit without appearing in the written Constitution. But these theorists decline
to wrestle with a central claim of small-c theory, namely that
nontextual constitutional rules can be as authoritative, as entrenched, and as much the subject of judicial review as any rule
that does appear in the written Constitution. Professor Whittington expressly insists that judicial review may proceed only
on the basis of written constitutional rules; Professors Eskridge
and Ferejohn say much the same thing, albeit in softer voices. In
short, these theorists are tied to a big-C conception of judicial
review. And as described above, that conception is inconsistent
with prevailing practice. To be sure, the hybrid approach should
mitigate the anxiety that other forms of small-c theory often
provoke about subjective exercises of judicial review. But it does
so by denying the major flaw in big-C theory that small-c theory
comes to correct, namely the claim that textuality and judicial
review must always be bundled together.
By carving the attributes of constitutionality into two domains, the hybrid theorists execute a partial unbundling of constitutionality. That is an advance over a fully bundled picture of
constitutional law: it permits us to see that constitutional rules
come in different kinds. But the proposed division between the
two domains is itself a misleading form of bundling. It denies
the broader range of mix-and-match combinations that actually
manifest themselves in practice.
3. Repositioning judicial review.
Finally, consider the work of Professor David Strauss. In a
considerable body of work, Professor Strauss has developed the
argument that American practice regards constitutional law
largely as a body of judicial doctrine that evolves over time in
the way that other bodies of common law do, albeit with
some influence around the edges from the text of the written
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Constitution.197 Professor Strauss’s is a thoroughly small-c view.
He sees relatively little constitutional law as flowing from the
text,198 and he understands constitutional change to be a process
that usually takes place without the text’s being formally
amended.199 But although he sees more routes to constitutional
change than are imagined in Article V, Professor Strauss understands resistance to easy change as one of the central virtues of
constitutional law. Indeed, much of the point of constitutional
law for Professor Strauss is the entrenchment of desirable legal
norms against the pathologies and misjudgments of politics.200
The norms that Professor Strauss sees as healthily entrenched
tend to sound in structure or ethos, and—not surprisingly—
judicial review is for Professor Strauss a major mechanism of
their entrenchment. Professor Strauss adheres powerfully to the
view that the content of constitutional law changes with prevailing societal attitudes,201 so the entrenchment he seeks is only
relative. Still, Professor Strauss sees resistance to the excesses
of short-term political decisionmaking as a key virtue of constitutional law. His writing aims in large part to explain the legitimacy of judicial review as a mechanism of that resistance. And,
of course, it seeks to do so without recourse to the major big-C
ideas about the status of the text, which Professor Strauss regards as fallacies.
Professor Strauss accordingly presents a picture of judicial
decisionmaking on which judicial review is exercised on behalf of
a set of relatively knowable principles. Crucially, a large part of
the knowability of the principles arises from the judicial process
itself. Like common-law judges in other legal fields, Professor
Strauss says, judges in constitutional cases reason from principles previously articulated by other judges.202 The application of
those principles sometimes calls for change in the forms of modification, clarification, or other kinds of tweaking.203 Sometimes,
judges engage in a larger kind of change, if a previously articulated
197 See, for example, Strauss, The Living Constitution at 3 (cited in note 12);
Strauss, 114 Harv L Rev at 1458–59 (cited in note 50); Strauss, 63 U Chi L Rev at 877–
79 (cited in note 15).
198 See, for example, Strauss, 63 U Chi L Rev at 877 (cited in note 15).
199 See Strauss, 114 Harv L Rev at 1457–58 (cited in note 50).
200 See, for example, Strauss, 63 U Chi L Rev at 929 (cited in note 15).
201 See Strauss, The Living Constitution at 42 (cited in note 12); Strauss, 114 Harv L
Rev at 1459 (cited in note 50).
202 Strauss, 63 U Chi L Rev at 879, 886–87 (cited in note 15).
203 See Strauss, The Living Constitution at 79–80 (cited in note 12); Strauss, 63 U
Chi L Rev at 888 (cited in note 15).
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idea now appears obviously and grievously wrong, but such cases are exceptional.204 Throughout, the underlying sources of the
constitutional law that judges apply include longstanding practices, the nature of society’s fundamental political institutions,
and judicial precedents that have been accepted over time and
which reflect and codify those underlying sources.205 The long acceptance of an important practice or principle—or, perhaps even
more so, of a judicial precedent articulating such a practice or
principle—indicates that the practice, principle, or precedent enjoys constitutional status. Some such things, Professor Strauss
says, “are every bit as much a part of the Constitution as the
most explicit textual provision.”206 In light of that constitutional
status, those practices, principles, and precedents are fit to be
defended by the exercise of judicial review.
As a descriptive account of American practice, Professor
Strauss’s common-law vision has enormous strengths. And to
the extent that that account is accurate, it should deflate—if not
completely allay—concerns about runaway judges who, untethered by text, will second-guess democratic lawmaking on the basis of their subjective whims. If courts exercise judicial review on
the basis of longstanding accepted principles, and if change occurs only (or even mostly) incrementally and only (or even mostly) when it is clearly indicated, then constitutional judging is not
as freewheeling as might be feared.
For present purposes, however, it is important to pay close
attention not just to the account Professor Strauss gives of judicial review but to the relationship his approach posits between
judicial review and constitutional status. Common-law constitutionalism as Professor Strauss presents it partially repositions
judicial review within the constitutional bundle. Rather than
seeing judicial review solely as a payoff of constitutional status,
common-law constitutionalism understands judicial review as a
basis for that status. Many propositions earn their constitutional status precisely because they have been adopted by judges exercising the power of judicial review and the resulting judgments have been steadily reaffirmed over time. That
constitutional status, once established, seems to solidify the legitimacy of judicial review for the relevant propositions. Judicial
204 See Strauss, The Living Constitution at 35–36 (cited in note 12); Strauss, 63 U
Chi L Rev at 906 (cited in note 15).
205 See, for example, Strauss, 114 Harv L Rev at 1459 (cited in note 50).
206 Strauss, 63 U Chi L Rev at 898 (cited in note 15).
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review is appropriate in these circumstances, Professor Strauss
tells us, because the principles on behalf of which judicial review
is exercised are constitutional principles, if we understand constitutionality correctly.207
That move in the argument is worth a little bit of scrutiny.
What, exactly, does calling a certain set of nontextual propositions “constitutional” add to the claim that they are fit subjects
for judicial review because they are long-accepted judgments
that have been reaffirmed over time, reaffirmed in particular
through the practice of judicial review itself? One reason to deploy the characterization “constitutional” when describing such
propositions is that reasonable communication sometimes calls
for shorthands. But that may not be the only reason, or even the
principal reason, why Professor Strauss’s theory presents itself
as an account of constitutionality, rather than just an argument
about a complex set of factors that justify the exercise of judicial
review.
Within the discourse of constitutional law, establishing that
a rule has constitutional status is generally tantamount to persuading one’s audience that that rule is supreme, entrenched,
and enforceable through judicial review. This is a matter of habits of thought. To the question “Why can courts enforce that rule
in the face of a contrary legislative decision?” the answer “Because that rule is a constitutional rule” is presumed to be sufficient. But on reflection, that answer is only sufficient if there is
some reason why all rules called “constitutional” are entitled to
supremacy, entrenchment, and judicial review. If one already
thinks that the long acceptance of some structural or ethical
proposition is sufficient justification for judges to treat that
proposition as judicially enforceable, the label “constitutional” is
a convenient shorthand. But if one is skeptical of that claim, one
should be no less skeptical after the label “constitutional” is
applied.
My argument is not that we need a theory of constitutionality that will answer the hard questions about the criteria for supremacy, entrenchment and judicial review. It is that we should
not turn to a theory of constitutionality to answer those questions. Most helpfully understood, “constitutionality” is a shorthand for several overlapping but differentiable constellations of
properties, and no account of bases and payoffs can be accurate
207

See, for example, id.
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as applied to all of the different configurations. Some propositions that are in the text are structural, and some are ethical,
and some are both, and perhaps some are neither, and some but
not all are supreme or entrenched, and some but not all are fit
subjects for judicial review. Some structural propositions and
some ethical propositions are properly regarded as supreme, or
as entrenched, and some are not; some are fit subjects for judicial review, and some are not.
A general theory of constitutionality will not tell us which
are which. For that task, we need separate theories that deal directly with the different sticks in the bundle. For example, a
theory that could guide the exercise of judicial review might offer an account of the substantive virtues and vices of that practice in light of what we know about the behavior of courts, the
behavior of other governmental decisionmakers, and the aims
and values of American government. Obviously, such a theory
would have many contestable elements, and it is fanciful to imagine that practitioners of constitutional law would ever reach
full agreement on the relevant questions. But at least such a
theory would be trying to answer the right questions. Trying to
settle the question by reference to the category of constitutionality would beg those questions—and it might be no less contentious.
CONCLUSION
“Constitutional” is a term of approbation. We use it to mark
rules, principles, and values as having an exalted status. But
the attributes of that status vary, such that establishing the
constitutionality of a rule does not reliably establish much else.
It may imply that the rule is textual, or supreme, or entrenched,
or enforceable through judicial review, and often those implications will be borne out. But often they will be misleading. To
think clearly about a rule, it is important to focus on the separate sticks in the constitutional bundle more than on the question of constitutionality itself. Answering that question may not
tell us what we need to know. And when describing a rule as
“constitutional,” it would often be helpful to specify the sense in
which the term is meant.
One might wonder whether this analysis suggests that we
should strive to avoid the term “constitutional” and instead always speak directly about the separate substantive attributes to
which that label points. I do not think that conclusion follows.
Like many other terms that name a variety of different but
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related things, “constitutional” is a reasonable shorthand much
of the time. The task before the analyst who would think clearly
about the set of things that “constitutional” names is to avoid
mistaking the shorthand for a fully specified concept. Besides,
any recommendation that American lawyers purge the word
“constitutional” from their vocabularies would be quixotic. The
term is deeply embedded within our discourse, and the practitioner who tried to do without it would be committing malpractice. Whatever its ambiguities, the description of a rule as constitutional carries a claim, or at least a strong implication, of
exalted status, and in an adversarial profession it is unwise to
unilaterally disarm oneself of potent rhetorical tools. And in a
different vein, the methodological commitments of my analysis
suggest that the idea of a bundled status called “constitutionality” is a social fact to be taken seriously, even if the ostensible
content of that idea gives way under scrutiny. After all, my
analysis is committed to observing the practice of constitutional
law as it actually operates. The propensity to bundle the attributes of constitutionality—even if only by creative interpretation
and other forms of legerdemain—is a robust feature of the practice of constitutional law, no less so than the reality that many
constitutional rules lack one or more of those attributes when
carefully considered. Learning to see unbundled constitutional
rules is an advance over seeing them only in a simpler way. But
the unbundled perspective is not the end of the matter, because
the practice sets value on treating constitutionality as bundled.
So the constitutional lawyer must be able to rebundle constitutionality as well as to unbundle it, and he must know when—or
in what role—to do which.
Exploring the precise dynamics by which prevailing practice
strives to maintain constitutionality as a bundled status seems
like a fruitful project for another paper. In closing this one, and
perhaps to suggest a bridge to that other inquiry, I offer one final set of observations.
Strictly speaking, none of the attributes associated with
constitutionality necessarily entails any of the others. But there
are some patterns. Above, I noted that structure and ethos are
categories into which many rules regarded as constitutional fall,
rather than criteria that qualify rules as constitutional. Which
structural and ethical norms should be deemed supreme or entrenched or judicially reviewable is a hard question, one that I
do not think can be answered wholesale. It is generally the case,
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though, that if a structural or ethical proposition is regarded as
supreme or as entrenched—whether in the Article V sense or
less formally, meaning that it is treated as not to be revised in
the ordinary course—it is likely to be called a constitutional
rule. And once we think of it as a constitutional rule, we may
come to associate it with the text of the Constitution, even if
competent readers of English lacking awareness of the proposition would not find it in the text.
Consider some illustrative examples. Only after decisionmakers developed the substantive intuition that free speech
should run against the states and equal protection against the
federal government did the textual devices of incorporation and
reverse incorporation come to seem natural. Something similar
may be happening today with the anticommandeering rule, as it
shifts from a nontextual principle to an interpretation of the
Necessary and Proper Clause.208 In other words, once constitutionality is established, rules may move along the continuum of
textuality described above.209 Rules that were once recognized as
nontextual may become associated with particular clauses by
virtue of official stories, and rules that are associated with
clauses by virtue of official stories may so color our intuitions
about the text that we come to think of the rules as fairly implied by the text rather than merely associated with it. As an official matter, of course, textuality is the paradigmatic basis of
constitutional status. But in circumstances like these, textuality
is a payoff rather than a source.
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US Const Art I, § 8, cl 18.
See Part I.A.

